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INTRODUCTION

Bangladesh is a lower riparian nation located in the Ganges
Delta of the Indian subcontinent. It faces staggering challenges in
its attempts to provide a burgeoning population1 with sanitary
water for consumption and agriculture. Despite the abundance of
freshwater in the region in the form of surface water2 and
groundwater, Bangladesh faces significant obstacles in leveraging
these resources.3 Part of the reason is historical. British colonial
rulers did little to develop water resources in East Bengal and this
neglect has proved difficult to surmount.4
Due to its location at the mouth of a 1560-mile (2510-kilometer)
river basin5 settled by over 350 million people,6 Bangladesh has
1 In 2009, Bangladesh‘s population increased by 1.4% to over 162 million
people. Population, Total, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
/SP.POP.TOTL (last visited Mar. 15, 2011); Population Growth (Annual %), WORLD
BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW (last visited Mar. 15,
2011).
2 Approximately 230 rivers are scattered throughout the country. FOOD &
AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IRRIGATION IN ASIA IN FIGURES 49 (1999).
Bangladesh has an average annual surface water flow of about 1073 million acre
feet; approximately 93% of this water comes from India via rivers, and the
remaining 7% comes from rainfall. Surface Water, BANGLAPEDIA: NATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANGLADESH, http://bpedia.org/S_0614.php (last visited Mar.
15, 2011). See generally Water Profile of Bangladesh, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH (Mar.
30,
2007,
8:34
PM),
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Water_profile_of
_Bangladesh.
3 Bangladesh possesses natural resources in quantities that typically correlate
to agricultural abundance and prosperity, but, as one observer puts it, this seems
merely a ―cruel paradox‖ in the face of the country‘s extreme poverty. Tauhidul
A. Khan, Management and Sharing of the Ganges, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 455, 458
(1996).
4 See id. at 459 (noting, as an example, the failure of British colonial rulers to
develop infrastructure enabling irrigation).
5 Ganges River, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com
/EBchecked/topic/225359/Ganges-River (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
6 G. TYLER MILLER & SCOTT SPOOLMAN, LIVING IN THE ENVIRONMENT:
PRINCIPLES, CONNECTIONS, AND SOLUTIONS 538 (16th ed. 2009) (discussing pollution
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surface water that is teeming with harmful microorganisms and
other pollutants. Floods are a major contributor to this pollution.
Around 70% of Bangladesh‘s surface is underwater during the
monsoon season, between June and September.7 The monsoons,
aside from destroying crops and property, effectively render the
country a ―connected sewer.‖8
Because of limitations in
Bangladesh‘s sanitation and healthcare infrastructures—as well as
the sheer density of the population9—unsafe surface water
conditions are not dealt with prior to public consumption,
resulting in widespread illness and death. In the 1970s, nearly
250,000 children in Bangladesh died each year from waterborne
diseases.10
Another major obstacle to delivering clean surface water is its
inconsistent availability. There is a tremendous disparity between
the amount of water available during the monsoon season and the
dry season.11 The water diversion practices of Bangladesh‘s upper
riparian neighbor, India, are a partial cause; by controlling the flow
of the Ganges at the Farakka Barrage, India allows—some claim—
too much water to flow into Bangladesh during the monsoon
season and too little during the dry season.12 These practices
of the Ganges river basin in the context of India and stating ―[a]bout 350 million
people—almost one-third of [India‘s] population—live in the Ganges River basin.
Very little of the sewage produced by these people and by the industries of 29
large cities in the basin is treated‖).
7 ANDREW A. MEHARG, VENOMOUS EARTH: HOW ARSENIC CAUSED THE WORLD‘S
WORST MASS POISONING 5 (2005).
8 Id. at 6.
9 See Khan, supra note 3, at 458 (―The population pressure in Bangladesh is
greater and the occupation of the flood plains more intense than in India and
Nepal in the Ganges basin. Thus, flood damage and distress is significantly
higher in Bangladesh . . .‖).
10 Statement on TVNZ Sunday Programme, UNICEF N.Z. (Aug. 9, 2010),
http://www.unicef.org.nz/article/1528/StatementonTVNZSundayprogramme
.html; Andrew Buncombe, How the West Poisoned Bangladesh, INDEPENDENT (Mar.
21, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/how-the-westpoisoned-bangladesh-1924631.html.
11 Because of the flow disparity between the floods in the monsoon season
and the drought during the dry season, Bangladesh‘s manageable surface water
resources are thought to be 80% of the dependable flow in March during the premonsoon season. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 2, at 49;
see also Bangladesh, AQUASTAT, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries
/bangladesh/index.stm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (providing additional statistics
about the impact seasonal change has on surface water resources in Bangladesh).
12 See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 2, at 49 (noting
that the ‖dam was a source of tension between the two countries, with
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adversely affect Bangladesh‘s attempts at effective water
management. The practices do not simply deprive Bangladesh of
surface water for agriculture; they also have significant ecological,
economic, and health effects.13
The region‘s groundwater resources, unfortunately, provide
little respite. The Bangladesh government, with the help of
international organizations, attempted to alleviate water provision
problems by introducing a solution which utilized its plentiful
groundwater resources. In the early 1970s, the United Nations
Children‘s Fund (―UNICEF‖) encouraged the Bangladesh
government and NGOs to install approximately 900,000
groundwater-extracting devices called tube-wells throughout
Bangladesh.14 Initially this program appeared successful: illness
due to waterborne diseases dropped drastically and the infant
mortality rate was halved from 1990 to 1996.15 The Bangladeshi
people traded their dependence on water from upstream rivers
and ponds to dependence, instead, on groundwater. Currently it is
estimated that there are more than 10 million tube-wells in rural
Bangladesh—one tube-well per 11 people.16
Unfortunately, it was discovered—first in 1978,17 then
confirmed by scientists in 1983,18 and then brought to world
attention in 1993 by the Bangladesh Department of Public Health
and Engineering in Dhaka19—that groundwater from these tubewells was tainted with geogenic (naturally occurring) arsenic.20
Bangladesh asserting that the dam held back too much water during the dry
season and released too much water during monsoon rains‖).
13 See generally Nahid Islam, Indo-Bangladesh Common Rivers: The Impact on
Bangladesh, 1 CONTEMP. S. ASIA 203 (1992) (discussing, inter alia, the extensive
effects of India‘s Farakka Barrage project on the environment and economy of
Bangladesh).
14 Statement on TVNZ Sunday Programme, supra note 10.
15 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 7.
16 Statement on TVNZ Sunday Programme, supra note 10.
17 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 7.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 14.
20 A lawsuit by a Bangladeshi man was filed in British High Court accusing
the British Geological Survey (―BGS‖) of gross negligence when it conducted
research for the UN tube-well drilling operation and failed to discover the arsenic
contamination. Alastair Lawson, Bangladesh Arsenic Case Begins, BBC NEWS, Mar.
25, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2886079.stm (reporting on the
commencement of legal proceedings). The court ultimately found in favor of
BGS. Bangladesh Man Loses Arsenic Case, BBC NEWS, July 5, 2006, http://news
.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5150210.stm. This outcome was likely positive for
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This longstanding issue has drawn gradually increasing attention
in the world arena.21
By drinking the groundwater—and by cooking and growing
crops with it—Bangladesh suffers a slow, Napoleonic demise.
Long-term exposure to arsenic ―causes cancer of the skin, lungs,
urinary bladder, and kidney, as well as other skin changes such as
pigmentation changes and thickening (hyperkeratosis).‖22 It is
estimated that between 4623 and 7024 million people are currently
drinking water that contains more than 10 micrograms per liter of
arsenic, which is the provisional World Health Organization
(―WHO‖) guideline value of acceptable arsenic consumption.25
Further, it is estimated that between 35 and 77 ―million people in

Bangladesh; holding entities like the BGS liable for negligence in this type of
situation probably serves as a disincentive for international organizations
considering investment in Bangladesh water management.
21 Bangladesh Government and UN officials published a report on March 22,
2010 calling for ―urgent action to tackle what remains a huge problem of
contamination, both from drinking water and from crops such as rice that are
irrigated with contaminated water.‖ Buncombe, supra note 10. Prior to this, the
crisis had not been ignored, per se, but had received, at best, scattered (though
impassioned) coverage. See, e.g., Arsenic-Polluted Well Water Threatens Bangladesh
Villagers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1997, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/1997/08/07/world/arsenic-polluted-well-water-threatens-bangladesh-villagers
.html (revealing the havoc wreaked on individual families by the wells containing
arsenic-contaminated water); Barry Bearak, Bangladeshis Sipping Arsenic as Plan for
Safe Water Stalls, N. Y. TIMES, July 14, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2002/07/14/world/bangladeshis-sipping-arsenic-as-plan-for-safe-water-stalls
.html (describing the lethal, unintended consequences of the tube-well plan);
Barry Bearak, Death by Arsenic: A Special Report; New Bangladesh Disaster: Wells that
Pump Poison, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1998, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/1998/11/10/world/death-by-arsenic-a-special-report-new-bangladeshdisaster-wells-that-pump-poison.html (reporting on the horrors caused by the
poisonous wells); John Vidal, Deadly Waters, GUARDIAN, May 8, 2003,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2003/may/08/science.highereducation
(detailing the circumstances surrounding the mass arsenic poisoning); David
Rohde & Julfikar Ali Manik, The Lethal Water Wells of Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES, July
17, 2005, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C04EFD9103CF934
A25754C0A9639C8B63 (highlighting the perniciousness of the contaminated
wells).
22 Arsenic in Drinking Water, Fact Sheet N°210, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (last
revised
May
2001),
available
at
http://www.knowledgebank.irri.org
/factsheetsPDFs/Health_and_Nutrition/whoFS_arsenic.pdf.
23 Seth H. Frisbie et al., The Concentrations of Arsenic and Other Toxic Elements
in Bangladesh’s Drinking Water, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1147, 1152 (2002).
24 An Interview with Mahmuder Rahman: Bangladesh’s Arsenic Agony, 86 BULL.
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 11, 11 (2008) [hereinafter Rahman Interview].
25 Arsenic in Drinking Water, Fact Sheet No 210, supra note 22.
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Bangladesh have been chronically exposed to increased
concentrations of arsenic through drinking water‖ since the
1970s,26 and that approximately 21% of the ―all-cause‖ deaths in
Bangladesh are associated with arsenic contamination.27
Thus, Bangladesh is faced with a tremendous dilemma in its
attempts to provide water to its population. It must decide upon
some combination of relying on surface water and relying on
groundwater. Neither type can be comfortably relied upon.
Reliance on surface water is hampered by biohazards and
pollutants deposited locally and upstream. It is also restricted by
weeks of little to no water during drought seasons. Reliance on
groundwater, meanwhile, has lethal implications due to arsenic.
This Article will not argue that either option is wholly better
than the other. Nor will it attempt to decide what precise
proportion of surface water and groundwater is ideal.28 Instead, it
will examine why Bangladesh cannot merely rely upon
groundwater, and then consider the feasibility of ensuring a
constant quantity of surface water for Bangladesh by utilizing
international law.
Future attempts at ensuring sufficient and sanitary water
delivery will fail unless—in conjunction with the policy articulated
in Bangladesh‘s 2004 National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation
(specifically, a ―preference to surface water over groundwater as
source for water supply‖29)—Bangladesh leverages international
law to limit the damming practices of its upper riparian neighbors
and actively pursues an internal water augmentation plan to
ensure a constant availability of surface water. This will ease the
pressure on the dual goals of purifying arsenic-tainted
groundwater and weaning the population off of groundwater in
cases where a long-term purification solution cannot be
implemented.
In Part 2, this Article will (1) examine the government‘s
attempts at arsenic mitigation and (2) note potential shortcomings
26 Maria Argos et al., Arsenic Exposure from Drinking Water, and All-Cause and
Chronic-Disease Mortalities in Bangladesh (HEALS): A Prospective Cohort Study, 376
LANCET 252, 252 (2010) (emphasis added).
27 Id. at 255.
28 In 1999, UNICEF published a report very reasonably stating that ―‗[a]
balanced package of interventions, that uses safe surface, ground and rain water
sources as dictated by the local situation will ultimately be the most appropriate
solution.‘‖ MEHARG, supra note 7, at 178 (quoting the 1999 UNICEF report).
29 National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation, §5.2.2 (2004) (Bangl.).
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in these efforts. This Article will establish that relying on the
current methods to mitigate the arsenic problem—i.e. finding safe,
often groundwater-based alternative water sources or espousing
arsenic purification processes—are insufficient because they fail to
address the looming issue of increasingly contaminated soil. Part 2
will discuss difficulties in improving water quality and argue that
Bangladesh will need to take more active steps if it truly intends to
reestablish the population‘s reliance on surface water.
Part 3 will explore the difficulties of transitioning back to
surface water from the perspective of quantity. It will (1) highlight
the difficulties of negotiating for more water from its upper
riparian neighbors by reviewing how the 1996 Treaty on Sharing of
the Ganges Waters at Farakka30 (―Treaty‖ or ―Ganges Treaty‖)—
the region‘s sole river treaty—was secured and (2) identify the
dangers of upper riparian plans such as the upcoming India InterBasin Water Transfer (―IBWT‖) Project, which will increase the
burden on the already strained surface water resources in
Bangladesh.
Section 4 will attempt to outline the ways in which Bangladesh
might secure a larger and more constant flow of water. It will (1)
examine the upper riparian obligations of India that arise from the
Ganges Treaty, which limits India‘s ability to divert more water
from the Ganges, (2) explore the ways broader international law
concepts might help Bangladesh in its attempts to prevent more
surface water loss, and (3) argue in favor of surface water
augmentation projects like the stalled Ganga Barrage.
2.

SHORTCOMINGS IN CURRENT ARSENIC MITIGATION EFFORTS

The response to the arsenic crisis by the national government
and international aid organizations has been called, by one
observer, ―in the main, ineffective.‖31 It is difficult to argue
otherwise, given the number of Bangladeshis still drinking,
cooking with, and farming with arsenic-tainted water. This section
will first attempt to identify high-level reasons for this lack of
progress; then it will catalogue the Bangladesh government‘s
response to the crisis.
30 See generally Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of India and
the Government of the People‘s Republic of Bangladesh on Sharing of the
Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka, Bangl.-India, Dec. 12, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 519 (1997)
[hereinafter 1996 Ganges Treaty].
31 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 21.
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2.1. High-Level Reasons for Lack of Progress
Despite significant investment from outside entities, large-scale
projects in Bangladesh seem to stagnate. Andrew Meharg points to
spending patterns in borrowed money from the World Bank as an
indicator of this phenomenon.32 In particular, he points to a $34
million interest-free loan that was granted in 1998 to fight the
arsenic crisis.33 This was the Bangladesh Arsenic Mitigation Water
Supply Project (―BAMWSP‖),34 a $44 million project35 whose
development objective was to ―reduce mortality and morbidity in
rural and urban populations caused by arsenic contamination of
groundwater using sustainable water supply, health, and water
management strategies.‖36 By 2000, only $2 million were spent, all
on committees and consultants; by 2004, only $6 million were
spent.37 While the failure to spend is hardly a definitive indicator
of project failure (given that this does not take into account the
actual accomplishment of the project‘s goals), evidently some aspect
of this massive project malfunctioned.
The World Bank‘s own evaluation of this project also indicates
a less than stellar performance, though it is not as grim in its

32 See id. (describing a representative stalled aid program in Bangladesh and
its related spending).
33 Id.
34 See generally RURAL DEV. SECTOR UNIT, WORLD BANK, S. ASIA REGION,
PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT FOR A PROPOSED CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 24.2
MILLION EQUIVALENT TO THE PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH FOR A ARSENIC
MITIGATION WATER SUPPLY PROJECT, Report No. 18252–BD (1998) (providing a
detailed overview of the BAMWSP project, including a brief description of key
interventions that the project will support, such as on-site mitigation, improved
understanding of the arsenic problem, and strengthening of implementation
capacity).
35 This figure includes contributions from sources beyond the World Bank
coffers, including the Bangladesh Government and foreign financers. Id. at 3.
36 ENV‘T & WATER RES. UNIT, WORLD BANK, S. ASIA REGION, IMPLEMENTATION
COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 24.2 MILLION
(US$ 44.4 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO BANGLADESH FOR ARSENIC MITIGATION WATER
SUPPLY, Report No. ICR000028, at iii (2007) [hereinafter BAMWSP RESULTS]. The
project, among other things, was responsible for painting shallow tube-wells red,
testing groundwater for arsenic for inclusion in a national database, and installing
a variety of alternative water sources for villagers: 9,272 deep tube-wells, 300
rainwater harvesting systems, 393 dug wells, and 1 piped water supply system.
Id. at iii–v.
37 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 21.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss3/3

SARWAR.DOC

2011]

3/18/2011 9:26 PM

ARSENIC MITIGATION IN BANGLADESH

851

evaluation. BAMWSP was deemed ―moderately satisfactory‖ in a
2007 evaluation,38 despite negative initial evaluations.39
This positive grade might be appropriate; the project did
experience a burst of successful spending activity in its later
years.40 However, critics might note that the project‘s ―success‖
included a considerable reframing of its objectives, which involved
a removal of health activities to another World Bank project which
never came to fruition, four extensions of the grant closing date,
and two grant cancellations (due to slow performance and unutilized credit, respectively).41 In short, the ―moderately‖ good
grade seems predicated on changing the curve.
Other World Bank projects devoted to helping Bangladesh with
water management have had even less luck than BAMWSP. One
example is the 1996 Fourth Dhaka Water Supply Project
(―FDWSP‖),42 which was deemed ―unsatisfactory‖ upon review43
and prematurely cancelled after $50.6 million of an $80.3 million
grant had already been spent.44
Another example is the
Bangladesh Water Supply Program Project (―BWSPP‖), the 2004
follow-up project to BAMWSP, which involved a $40 million dollar
grant.45 BWSPP, much like BAMWSP, stagnated in its early stages,

BAMWSP RESULTS, supra note 36, at i.
Id. at 8 (―Over a 2½-year period (December 1999 to December 2000; June
2002 to December 2003), the project was rated ‗unsatisfactory‘ for
implementation.‖).
40 Id. at vi.
41 Id. at 3–4.
42 WORLD BANK, S. ASIA REGION, IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT ON A
CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDRS 51.0 MILLION (US $80.3 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO
THE PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH FOR A FOURTH DHAKA WATER SUPPLY
PROJECT, Report No. 25247, at 1 (2002) [hereinafter FDWSP IMPLEMENTATION]
(describing project results and data from the Fourth Dhaka Water Supply Project).
43 The $175.8 million project was intended, among other things, ―to start
institutional reforms to enhance the efficiency of the water and sanitation sector in
Dhaka by putting it on a commercial basis, and preparing a strategy for greater
private sector participation.‖ Id. at 5. This objective was not met, ―even though
the project‘s major physical works were completed satisfactorily, below budget
and ahead of time, and a number of positive aspects concerning DWASA‘s
institutional development were achieved.‖ Id.
44 Id. at 28–29.
45 WORLD BANK, BANGLADESH WATER SUPPLY PROGRAM PROJECT PROPOSAL TO
RESTRUCTURE, No. 45616, at 1 (2008) [hereinafter BWSPP RESTRUCTURE].
38
39
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with only $1 million of the credit disbursed during its first three
years.46
Examining these projects suggests that at least part of the
problem arises from within the Bangladesh government itself.47 A
cynical explanation is that government officials in Bangladesh are
corrupt, ineffective, or uncaring.48 Alternatively, one may posit
that the politicians have their hands tied as a result of political
instability and rapid party-control turnover. Any attempt to
counter this effect—via, for example, government measures that
preserve project-related job security and provide funding resistant
to political turmoil or via a results-based reward/job-security
system that forces individual interests to coincide with project
interests by disincentivizing funding misallocations, corruption, or
blithe ineffectiveness—might be predicated on an unrealistic hope
for non-partisan entities being effective in a highly partisan
political climate.
Meharg also points to overwhelming health issues on the
government‘s plate, such as AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, diarrhea,
and malnutrition, as a reason for the ineffectiveness of large-scale
efforts; as he puts it, ―arsenic is just another entry on a long list of
killers.‖49
The intrinsically challenging situation is further
complicated by the Bangladesh government‘s need to rely on
external aid to resolve any public health problems.50 When one
46 BAMWSP RESULTS, supra note 36, at 8 (―[BWSPP] is in the same position in
which BAMWSP was in its early years, with extremely slow progress made thus
far, and only US$1 million of the credit disbursed after nearly three years.‖). In
2007, the project was ultimately swept away as a priority by two devastating
floods and Cyclone ―SIDR.‖ BWSPP RESTRUCTURE, supra note 45, at 2. It has since
been significantly restructured to include funding reallocation for building water
supplies for flood and cyclone victims and less ambitious goals in the area of rural
piped water supply and municipal water supply. See id at 4–7 (describing
changes in scope and ambition for the project components).
47 FDWSP IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 42, at 6 (―[M]aybe because the
program of change was never fully owned by the Bangladeshi agencies
concerned, watered-down compromises were often the best that could be
achieved during implementation.‖).
48 See Asadullah Khan, The Looming Water Crisis, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), May 16,
2009,
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=88351
(―The past governments were largely to blame for their failure to assess the
gravity of the situation and curb siphoning of groundwater. And the present Alled government that came to power with some firm pledges must not indulge in
lip-service but get into action.‖).
49 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 19.
50 See Allan H. Smith et al., Contamination of Drinking-Water by Arsenic in
Bangladesh: A Public Health Emergency, 78 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 1093, 1096–97
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combines these factors with logistical concerns not unique to
Bangladesh (such as underdeveloped communication and
transportation systems), it is perhaps not surprising that the
government and established, oft-effective organizations such as the
WHO find it difficult to educate the community,51 enact
intervention programs,52 or act ―at all levels.‖53 This is unfortunate
given that, ―in contrast to diseases like malaria, cholera and
tuberculosis, which require a more complex public health
response, the response to arsenic contamination is clear-cut:
provide arsenic-free water.‖54
Mahmuder Rahman, a physician and expert on the arsenic
crisis, who has spent considerable time helping the Bangladesh
government tackle the problem,55 points in frustration to the more
general explanation of systemic misdirection in mitigation attempts.
Too much effort, he notes, is being put into developing short-term
alternative safe water sources.56 Additionally, solutions are being
implemented without a proper understanding of Bangladesh‘s
―geography, culture, and pattern of water use.‖57 He points to a
failure to consider the total water resources of the country—among
them, surface water:
Most of these experts come with the preconceived idea that
dug wells and surface water are totally polluted with
bacteria, but they forget that with simple and affordable
technology these water supplies can be made safe and can
play a major part in mitigation of this major problem.58

(2000) (summarizing the panoply of challenges organizations in Bangladesh face
in dealing with health crises and discussing short term strategies to address
arsenic poisoning).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See Arsenic in Drinking Water, Fact Sheet No 210, supra note 22 (―The poor
availability of reliable information hinders action at all levels and may lead to
panic, exacerbated if misleading reports are made. Effective information channels
have yet to be established to those affected and concerned.‖)
54 Smith et al., supra note 50, at 1097.
55 Rahman took a leading role in the formulation of Bangladesh‘s National
Arsenic Mitigation Policy. Rahman Interview, supra note 24, at 11.
56 Id. at 11–12.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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Given the immense number of contributing reasons, it is easy to
come up with explanations of why efforts have been mired in
setbacks. Unfortunately, good data on which contributing reasons
have the most ―miring‖ effects are sparse or non-existent. Thus,
the question of how to speed up efforts is more difficult.
2.2. Issues with the Government Response
The Bangladesh government has generated internal policies
attempting to consolidate and streamline the arsenic mitigation
process. Given the stagnation established in the previous section,
it is unclear whether these policies are working. This section will
explore the ways in which Bangladesh‘s policies might be illdesigned for the task of arsenic mitigation.
2.2.1.

An Outdated Standard for Arsenic Contamination

First, many of the policies enacted in Bangladesh operate on the
assumption that arsenic contamination should be prevented when
it is above the Bangladesh National Standard59 of 50 parts per
billion (―ppb‖).60 This standard is mentioned in the 2004 National
Policy for Arsenic Mitigation61 and the 2004 Implementation Plan
for Arsenic Mitigation in Bangladesh (―IPAMB‖).62
This is an obsolete standard. The International Standards for
Drinking-Water originally established 0.20 mg/L as an allowable
concentration for arsenic in 1958.63 In 1963, the standard was reevaluated and reduced to 0.05 mg/L.64 In 1984, this was used as
WHO‘s ―Guideline Value,‖ spurring many countries to use this as
a national standard or as an interim target.65 Meharg suggests that
the revised 0.05 mg/L standard arose from an early 1900s
European measurement for survivable quantity of acute exposure
to arsenic, not chronic.66

59 Environment Conservation Rules 1997, sched. 3 (Bangl.) (setting the
national arsenic standard at .05 mg/L); see also Environment Conservation Act
1995 (Bangl.).
60 National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation § 1.1 (2004) (Bangl.).
61 Id.
62 Implementation Plan for Arsenic Mitigation in Bangladesh § 1 (2004).
63 Arsenic in Drinking Water, Fact Sheet No 210, supra note 22.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 11.
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The last edition of the WHO Guidelines for Drinking-Water
Quality—established in 1993—changed the concentration to 0.01
mg/L or 10 ppb.67
The Bangladesh government designs its processes for an
estimated 30 million people who are drinking water that contains
more than 50 mg/L arsenic.68 As noted before, up to 70 million
people—an additional 40 million, over double the government‘s
target—are drinking water that contains more than the WHO
guideline.69
In order to properly address its arsenic crisis, Bangladesh
should update its standard. It is currently directing the entirety of
its arsenic mitigation projects to a fraction of those who are in
danger of suffering from chronic arsenic poisoning.
2.2.2.

Plans, Policies, and Other Unenforced Suggestions

Another potentially crippling characteristic of Bangladesh‘s
water management policies is that they are nonbinding and, from a
practical perspective, judicially unenforceable. The documents
which direct Bangladesh‘s arsenic mitigation efforts—National
Water Policy of 1999,70 National Water Management Plan of 2001,71
National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation of 2004, and the IPAMB72—
are essentially guidelines. To date, there is no enforceable statute
that imposes any consequences upon local governments—or other
entities implementing arsenic mitigation technologies—for failing
to follow them.73 The policies primarily prescribe the formation of
Arsenic in Drinking Water, Fact Sheet No 210, supra note 22.
Rahman Interview, supra note 24, at 11.
69 Id.
70 Bangladesh‘s National Water Policy aims at providing direction to all
agencies working with the water sector and sets for them objectives. It is not an
Act and has no attached or specified form of enforcement. See generally National
Water Policy (1999) (Bangl.).
71 The National Water Management Plan is a framework plan with the
objective of ―rationalising and decentralising management of the sector.‖ 1
National Water Management Plan, at i (2001) (Bangl.). Line agencies and other
organizations are expected to plan and implement their own activities in a
coordinated manner ―in line with‖ the plan. Id. at iii.
72 This document arises directly from the National Policy for Arsenic
Mitigation. ―An implementation plan shall be prepared which will provide the
operational framework for arsenic mitigation activities in the country.‖ National
Policy for Arsenic Mitigation § 10.2 (2004) (Bangl.).
73 ASIAN DEV. BANK & WATER RES. PLANNING ORG. (Bangl.), VOLUME 1: FINAL
REPORT AND ROADMAP, ADB RETA PROJECT NO. 39199: PROCESS DEVELOPMENT FOR
67
68
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committees,74 ―suitable‖ regulatory schemes,75 or ―appropriate‖
regulatory measures.76 Occasionally, some provisions of these
documents are worded strongly and imply actual consequences in
the event of violation: Section 3.2.5 of the IPAMB, for example,
prohibits the installation of unapproved arsenic purification
technologies without first getting clearance from a government
committee responsible for ensuring their safety.77 The plan states:
[A]ll agencies/companies/manufacturers must be made
liable for any kind of failure of the unit, adverse affect to
any user and environmental damages caused by the
technology used.
An agreement ensuring consumer
protection and legal liability of the proponent should be
made between the proponent and the validating agency.78
Note, however, that despite its seeming strength, the language
does not indicate that private entities will actually be held liable—
because the plan is not a binding law it appropriately pushes the
private entity to include in its contract a provision which
subsequently may be taken to Bangladeshi courts for enforcement.
Again, the lack of such a contract provision would technically not
be legally problematic for an agency, company, or manufacturer.

PREPARING AND IMPLEMENTING INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PLANS
18, para. 64 (2009) [hereinafter ADB REPORT] (noting that while these policies
―appear to promote participatory and sustainable development of the water
sector‖ they ―are not judicially enforceable . . . although they may guide and
influence concerned ministries and agencies‖).
74 National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation § 6.1 (2004) (Bangl.) (―The
Government shall form a high level committee or designate any such existing
committee to oversee all activities, implementation programmes in accordance
with this policy.‖).
75 Id. § 6.6 (―Groundwater being a natural resource, a suitable regulatory
mechanism shall be in place to regulate all activities in relation to groundwater
such as exploration, exploitation and management.‖).
76 The government ―[s]hall formulate appropriate regulatory measures to
ensure that all research on arsenic in the country whether by local or expatriate
organisations or individual researchers are undertaken in a co-ordinated way and
the results are shared with the government of Bangladesh or its designated
agency . . .‖ Id. § 7.2.
77 See Implementation Plan for Arsenic Mitigation in Bangladesh § 3.2.5
(2004) (―While the marketing of the removal options should be through the
private sector the government shall . . . not allow marketing of any such
technology without proper testing and validation from Bangladesh Council for
Scientific and Industrial Research(BCSIR) [sic].‖).
78 Id.
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The issue is straightforward: because courts cannot and do not
mandate adherence to these national policies, it is unclear to what
extent local statutes or committees—formed from these policies—
can exercise power over water management activities.
This ―toothlessness‖ on the national legal level does not, of
course, wholly deprive the policies of value. For one thing, their
advisory flavor is part of their design79—the Bangladesh
government perhaps realized that a centralized statute for water
management would be logistically nightmarish, given the plethora
and variance of water sanitation problems across regions of
Bangladesh.80
Further, their existence is a significant boon to mitigation
efforts due to their relatively advanced level of detail. The
implementation plans, in particular, seem designed to be
operations manuals, bulked up with technological annexes81 and
similar components aimed at being practically useful to local
government officials.
Additionally, there is evidence that individual sections of these
plans and policies play a role in directing the activities of the
Bangladesh government and NGOs. Note, again, section 5.2.2 of
the National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation, which directs
organizations to ―[g]ive preference to surface water over
groundwater as source for water supply‖82—in accordance to this
provision, the World Bank limited the number of deep tube-wells it
installed for BAMWSP.83 The suggestions are being adhered to on
some level.

79 1 National Water Management Plan, at i (2001) (Bangl.) (stating that ‖the
Plan is a framework plan within which line agencies and other organisations are
expected to plan and implement their own activities in a coordinated manner‖).
80 This is reflected in the National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation which calls
for a ―[m]ove towards decentralised planning and delivery of safe water options
and health services through the grass root level local government institutions . . .
.‖ National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation § 6.4 (2004) (Bangl.).
81 See, e.g., Implementation Plan for Arsenic Mitigation in Bangladesh, Annex
A, Annex B, Annex C (2004) (providing, lists of arsenic-prone upazilas,and guides
for dug well and pond sand filter construction).
82 National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation § 5.2.2 (2004) (Bangl.).
83 See BAMWSP RESULTS, supra note 36, at 3–4 (―As surface water was
recommended as the sole arsenic-safe source in the National Arsenic Mitigation
Policy, implementation of the deep tubewell option was permitted, as an
exception, only in coastal areas . . .‖).
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But perhaps not enough. As one observer has noted, ―water
use laws of South Asia are rarely followed or enforced.‖84 There
has been some movement towards the passage of an enforceable
Water Act,85 one that would translate the National Water Policy
into law and ―thereby ensure integrated management,
development, and equitable utilization of the countries [sic] water
resources.‖86 Such an Act was slated for completion in 201087 (and
as yet, is not law). In the pipeline as well is a National Water Code
whose purpose is to ―assemble all of the various pieces of
legislation to ensure consistency and synergy in application.‖88 It
is unclear, however, whether either of these will be passed or will
be effective when passed.
2.2.3.

Lack of a Unified Groundwater Act

Bangladesh lacks a Groundwater Act. Because groundwater is
used extensively for both consumption and agriculture—despite
being poisoned—some type of regulation is needed, given how
much is used and how much poison is contained therein.
As noted before, it is estimated that the country operates more
than 10 million tube-wells.89 This is a drastic increase from the
1960s, when Bangladesh used almost no groundwater.90 The
percent of land irrigated by groundwater (total irrigated land) rose
from 4% in 1972 to 70% in 1999.91 By 2010, Bangladesh was

84 John C. Peck & Burke W. Griggs, Groundwater Law and Management: The
Asia (IWMI)-Kansas Program, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 315, 348 (2008).
85 See
generally Draft Bangladesh Water Act, 2008, available at
http://www.warpo.gov.bd/RETA/Draft%20BWA.pdf; Draft Bangladesh Water
Act, 2010, available at http://www.warpo.gov.bd/PDFs/Draft_BWA.pdf.
86 Summary of Regional Technical Assistance (RETA) Supporting IWRM
(Bangladesh), WATER RESOURCES PLANNING ORGANIZATION, http://www.warpo
.gov.bd/RETA/Reta.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) [hereinafter WARPO
REGIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WEBSITE]. WARPO is a Government agency
under the Ministry of Water Resources that forms an apex body in the water
sector that acts as a macro-level planning organization for integrated water
resources management. WATER RESOURCES PLANNING ORGANIZATION, http://
www.warpo.gov.bd/index.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
87 WARPO REGIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WEBSITE, supra note 86.
88 Id.
89 See Statement on TVNZ Sunday Programme, supra note 10.
90 See Tushaar Shah, The Groundwater Economy of South Asia: An Assessment of
Size, Significance, and Socio-Ecological Impacts, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 407, 408
(2006).
91 Id.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss3/3

SARWAR.DOC

2011]

3/18/2011 9:26 PM

ARSENIC MITIGATION IN BANGLADESH

859

expected to have withdrawn 70–75 cubic kilometers of
groundwater annually.92 Up to 94% of these tube-wells are
privately owned and sunk without regulation or monitoring.93
Observers have called for a Groundwater Act that would
control exploration, development, and management of
groundwater utilization.94 Such an Act should, at minimum, limit
tube-well drilling—a priority, given the present overabundance of
unmonitored groundwater use noted above. Observers have noted
that an ideal Groundwater Act would also take into account
conservation considerations, ensuring adequate replenishment of
underground aquifers and thus protecting wetlands, forests, and
open fields.95 This is not off of the Bangladesh government‘s
radar—a Groundwater Act was contemplated by the National
Policy for Arsenic Mitigation96 and the IPAMB.97 Terms regulating
groundwater were also articulated in the Bangladesh Draft Water
Act of 2008.98
Unfortunately, the lack of a Groundwater Act has led to grim
groundwater conditions that exacerbate the arsenic problem in
Bangladesh.99 Unfettered and unregulated tube-well placement
has led to water losses in channels and fields, inadequate drainage,
insufficient conjunctive use of tube-wells, and extensive pollution
(from agriculture and industry); these have led, in turn, to a
permanent depletion of static groundwater levels (as much as three
feet per year in Dhaka), rampant waterlogging, resource
salinization, a sinking water table, skyrocketing pumping and
irrigation costs, and, in urban areas, severe land subsidence.100
See id. at 415 fig.6.
MEHARG, supra note 7, at 7.
94 See AFIFA RAIHANA & DR. A Z M IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN, SILENT KILLER IN ACTION
110 (2004) (listing management recommendations for groundwater usage).
95 Id.
96 See National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation § 6.6 (2004) (Bangl.) (stating that
a ―regulatory mechanism‖ would be implemented in order to oversee
groundwater utilization).
97 See Implementation Plan for Arsenic Mitigation in Bangladesh § 6.2 (2004)
(stating that a Groundwater Act should be enacted to regulate all groundwater
related activities).
98 Draft
Bangladesh Water Act, 2008, ch. VI, § 47, available at
http://www.warpo.gov.bd/RETA/Draft%20BWA.pdf (setting forth conditions
for the control and protection of groundwater).
99 See Peck & Griggs, supra note 84, at 337 (citing the overexploitation of
groundwater as a reason for high levels of arsenic contamination in Bangladesh).
100 Id. at 331.
92
93
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Troublingly, the solutes finding their way into humans from
groundwater are not restricted to arsenic: aluminum, iron, zinc,
and copper are also present in Bangladeshi groundwater.101 One
study has estimated that tens of millions of Bangladeshis are
drinking water with unsafe levels of manganese, boron, barium,
chromium, molybdenum, nickel, lead, or uranium.102 In Dhaka,
―[g]eogenic mineralization, combined with groundwater depletion
and industrial pollution‖ has created ―alarmingly‖ high
concentrations of chromium, aluminum, and iron in drinking
water.103 Given that it is unclear what these poisons will do at
these quantities over time,104 a Groundwater Act seems extremely
important for slowing the systematic and myriad poisoning of the
Bangladeshi population.
John Peck and Burke Griggs note that India‘s lack of support of
a Groundwater Act stems in part from the complexity of
―enforc[ing] a centralized regulatory regime on millions of private
well owners.‖105 The case is precisely the same with Bangladesh. It
might be wise, thus, to look to India‘s example106 for some
guidance on how to structure internal policies regarding
groundwater management.107 However, the challenges India faces
See id. at 337 (listing solutes found in the groundwater of Bangladesh).
Frisbie et al., supra note 23, at 1152.
103 Peck & Griggs, supra note 84, at 337.
104 When arguing against dependence on groundwater, Rahman notes: ―We
do not want to risk bringing up other toxic material of which we have very little
knowledge, such as boron. It‘s only arsenic today, but we do not know what will
come next.‖ Rahman Interview, supra note 24, at 11.
105 Peck & Griggs, supra note 84, at 349.
106 India has a Central Ground Water Authority that monitors groundwater
contamination, regulates agencies involved in the construction of wells, reviews
and authorizes groundwater projects, and promotes conservation measures such
as rainwater harvesting. Officials are preparing a zoning atlas for the appropriate
use of water depending upon region, a plan by which states will regulate the
private market in water, and a plan to use satellite imagery to map groundwater.
Peck & Griggs, supra note 84, at 349–50.
107 Bangladesh, in conjunction with the Government of Denmark, is currently
engaged in various ―sub-projects‖ through its Policy Support Unit. One such
project is a groundwater map project, which is in its infancy stages. See generally
PROJECT SUPPORT UNIT, BANGL. MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOV‘T, RURAL DEV. & COOP.,
CONCEPT NOTE ON NATIONAL GROUNDWATER DATABASE FOR WATER SUPPLY AND
SANITATION IN BANGLADESH 2 (2009), available at http://www.psu-wss.org/images
/pdf/psuSubProject/GroundWaterMapping/Concept%20Paper_PSU_GWM.pdf.
Note how this is differently structured (necessarily) from projects we might see in
India as this project incorporates significant resources and financial aid of an
additional nation, a measure India does not necessarily need to take.
101
102
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in the implementation of its water management plans are in some
ways different from those faced by Bangladesh. India, for
example, does not have to deal with the unilateral water diversion
actions of a militarily and economically mighty upper riparian
neighbor.
2.2.4.

Complications in Implementing Alternative Water Sources

Successfully implementing alternative water sources in
Bangladesh has proven difficult. The first major problem is that
Bangladeshis still use shallow tube-wells despite the steps that the
Bangladesh government took to wean the population off of
groundwater. The second major problem is that there are
numerous technological and cultural wrinkles in implementing
alternative water sources that make the entire endeavor, due to the
lack of a reasonable monitoring system, prone to failure.
2.2.4.1.

Painting Oneself into a Corner

In response to the arsenic crisis, Bangladesh‘s government
came up with a straightforward solution to wean people off of
tube-wells. In conjunction with the World Bank,108 it tested tubewells across the nation and painted them green or red depending
on whether they were safe (green) or unsafe (red).
This solution, however, was not effective. The primary
problem was that the bad wells were not sealed off; water can still
be drawn from them. Rahman explains that after some time,
because of a lack of clean alternatives, people start to drink and use
the water again.109 Because arsenic is undetectable and causes no
immediate symptoms, people—especially children—return to the
poison.110 Meharg, in response to this issue, advocates destroying
the wells—―[i]f villagers have to travel distances of hundreds of
metres or more to obtain ‗green‘ water,‖ he reasons, ―they can be
tempted to use the red pumps.‖111
Others have noted that, ―[s]ince most of the tube[-wells] are
privately owned, people are moving their red tube[-wells] and
sinking‖ them elsewhere.112
This understandably creates
108
109
110
111
112

BAMWSP RESULTS, supra note 36, at iii–v.
Rahman Interview, supra note 24, at 11.
Id.
MEHARG, supra note 7, at 176.
RAIHANA & HUSSAIN, supra note 94, at 31–32 (emphasis added).
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confusion, since some red tube-wells are occasionally safe.113 To
compound the problem, green tube-wells may exhibit variability in
their arsenic content—after testing as safe, these tube-wells may
and have become contaminated with arsenic after operation.114
Finally, it is noteworthy that individuals living in Bangladesh
villages may not be familiar with the red/green signal concept; it is
a foreign, Western notion, one that is sometimes unnoticed in a
clearing during a long-desired water break.115
2.2.4.2.

Sustainability and Acceptability of Alternative Water
Sources.

The main alternative water supplies approved for use by the
Bangladesh government—and promoted by policymakers as longterm solutions116—are dug wells, pond sand filters, rainwater
harvesters, deep tube-wells, and a limited number of piped water
schemes (using groundwater and sometimes surface water).117
Each of these technologies has their advantages and
disadvantages, from the technological perspective or from the
perspective of ease of integration into Bangladeshi life. For the
most part, however, they seem ill-fit to serve as long-term
solutions.
The Arsenic Policy Support Unit (―APSU‖) conducted a survey
of the status of water supplies installed in arsenic-affected
communities. In addition to the above technologies, the study took
into account older installations, such as arsenic-iron removal plants
or shallow shrouded tube-wells.118 The study looked to see
whether the solutions were sustainable. Various alarming findings
were published.
The survey found that approximately 8.4% of the installations
were missing.119 The following reasons for their absence were

113
114
115
116
117

(2004).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Implementation Plan for Arsenic Mitigation in Bangladesh § 3.2.1–3.2.6

118 See AHAMMADUL KABIR & GUY HOWARD, ARSENIC POLICY SUPPORT UNIT,
THE SUSTAINABILITY OF ARSENIC MITIGATION INTERVENTIONS: A SURVEY OF THE
FUNCTIONAL STATUS OF WATER SUPPLIES 1 (2006) (summarizing the scope of the
APSU water supply survey).
119 Id. at 9.
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proposed: misappropriation of funds,120 inaccurate details
provided by stakeholders when the technology was installed,121 or
removal of installations because the community deemed them
ineffective.122
All three of these reasons appear to be problems that might be
solved by better designed local laws that actually impose liability
for engaging in fund misappropriation, inaccurate reporting from
stakeholders, or removal—the type of thing that local governments
do not necessarily have any incentive to enact as a result of soft
national guidance.123
The last of these reasons is particularly distressing, as it
suggests that some lack of community acceptance, for whatever
reason,124 has led to active ―disappearance‖ of governmentinstalled solutions. Aside from this being a glaring example of
poor government oversight, lack of acceptance suggests a societylevel barrier to successful implementation of arsenic mitigation
plans. Researchers at Dhaka University conducted a study of
technology acceptance in three areas of Bangladesh—with varying
quantities of installed arsenic technology—to examine the issue of
this very type of barrier.125
Before delving into the findings of these studies, it is important
to note that a separate survey by APSU was needed to determine
that these ―disappearances‖ were occurring in the first place. The
Bangladesh government did not have a centralized monitoring
system in place at the time of the study; and it is unclear whether
an effective centralized monitoring system is currently operating.
The APSU suggested, when publishing its results, that sponsoring
agencies supply Global Positioning System (―GPS‖) coordinates for
each water supply installation for entry into a database126 and that
Id. at 27.
Id.
122 Id.
123 See discussion supra Section 2.2.2. (Bangladesh‘s water management
policies are non-binding and judicially unenforceable).
124 These reasons may include a perception that the technology does not
work, knowledge that it does not work, or a general reluctance to use the
technology for cultural reasons.
125 RAIHANA & HUSSAIN, supra note 94, at 9 (identifying the three studied
regions—Pubail, Tilchandripur, and Araihazar—and describing the extent to
which each region has seen contamination, arsenic mitigation intervention, and
education regarding the problem).
126 KABIR & HOWARD, supra note 118, at 27.
120
121
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the government undertake periodic monitoring efforts utilizing
this database.
Research gives no indication that these
recommendations were incorporated into government policy. It is
also unclear that any such policy, if codified, has been enforced.
Without change in the government‘s monitoring efforts, arsenic
mitigation plans are bound to fail.
In its study, APSU found worrisome figures. Of all the
surveyed technologies, only 64% of the water supply installations
were functioning.127 For the most part, the malfunctioning
installations were either providing insufficient quantities of water
for the intended population—numbers that were perhaps
unrealistically128 defined in the IPAMB129—or actually suffered
from broken components.130 This latter explanation is perhaps
predictable for pond sand filters and dug wells, both of which, by
virtue of their low-lying design and use of shallow groundwater
aquifers, are vulnerable to regular Bangladeshi flooding.131
Rainwater harvesters also suffered significant implementation
problems.
Utilizing Bangladesh‘s rain resources has been
recommended by various observers,132 to the point of being
considered ―the solution‖ due to the fact that it is plentiful and
safe.133 But rainwater harvesters, according to APSU, seem to
malfunction the most of all the recommended technologies; while
this was a surprising find, it was attributed to lack of training
regarding their use.134
Afifa Raihana and A. Hussain, however, attribute rainwater
harvesters‘ poor performance to users‘ social reluctance to use
Id. at 10.
Id. at 33 (pointing out the need for a more ―realistic estimate of the
number of families served by individual options‖).
129 Implementation Plan for Arsenic Mitigation in Bangladesh § 3.3.1 (2004)
(recommending that at least one safe water source be available for every 50
families).
130 KABIR & HOWARD, supra note 118, at 11–14 (providing data regarding the
quantity of arsenic mitigation installations that suffer from malfunctioning
components).
131 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 177–78.
132 Id. at 179 (noting that home purification of collected rainwater was
―widely touted‖ as a short term solution, with foreign aid helping to develop and
advertise the technology).
133 But see RAIHANA & HUSSAIN, supra note 94, at 115 (disagreeing with
researchers who call rainwater ―the solution‖ because the option is not socially
acceptable).
134 KABIR & HOWARD, supra note 118, at 29.
127
128

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss3/3

SARWAR.DOC

2011]

3/18/2011 9:26 PM

ARSENIC MITIGATION IN BANGLADESH

865

rainwater. Their study found an unusually low acceptability of
Thus, the feasibility of its
rainwater with Bangladeshis.135
implementation seems hampered by the fact that it is not ―socially
acceptable.‖136
This lack of acceptability might very well be overcome if the
Bangladesh government was to take stronger measures
incentivizing rainwater as a solution—India is a successful
example of this. The Indian government recognized the need to
harvest rainwater and amended its building laws and zoning
codes.137 This seems to have inspired states to change their laws.
In at least ten Indian states, a method of rooftop rainwater
harvesting is mandatory for buildings; additionally, the Indian
government has installed such systems on government buildings
in Delhi.138
Internal Bangladeshi policy should also be updated to include
more incentives and security for the caretakers of alternative water
installations. APSU found that 59% of the installations in its
survey had regular maintenance.139 This is despite the fact that
nearly all installations had a caretaker.140 The study found a
(predictable) trend between proper caretaking and long-term
functionality of the alternative water source; thus APSU
recommended
―particular‖
government
attention
and
development of caretakers of these technologies, through training
and perhaps payment.141 It is unclear whether, without a stand on
the issue from the national level, state governments or local
governments will spontaneously enact such measures with any
consistency.
APSU also suggested a shift towards using deep tube-wells to
minimize microbial and arsenic contamination, and because deep
tube-wells are commonly preferred by communities due to their
RAIHANA & HUSSAIN, supra note 94, at 115.
Id.
137 Peck & Griggs, supra note 84, at 356 (explaining that rainwater can be
channeled from rooftop gutters into a storage tank for eventual filtering and use
and that these gutter installations are subject to regulation by the state).
138 Id.
139 KABIR & HOWARD, supra note 118, at 19 (noting, further, that 87% of the
working water supplies were receiving regular maintenance).
140 Id. (―All but 7 (0.7%) of the water supplies had a caretaker.‖).
141 Id. at 32 (concluding that caretakers are ―critical for the sustainability of
the water supply‖ and ―[e]nhancing [caretakers‘] performance through support to
water safety plans is likely to yield further benefits‖).
135
136
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comparative reliability.142 Raihana and Hussain had the same
finding regarding the popularity of community deep tube-wells as
a long-term solution.143
However, APSU notes that it has yet to be determined whether
these can be sunk safely.144 Indeed, there are various obstacles:
deep tube-wells are costlier to build than shallow tube-wells (by 45
times), result in longer carrying distances for women, and are
mistrusted by Bangladeshis in some villages; furthermore, the full
implications of drilling deep tube-wells are unknown.145 As
Meharg puts it, ―[e]ven geologists and hydrologists do not want to
give the go-ahead for a massive program to sink deep tube-wells.
They fear that these too could eventually become tainted, creating
even more problems down the line.‖146
In short, the optimal solution—and the solution that seems to
have the best chance of long-term success—is difficult to pursue
without significant government research. It will be necessary to
create—or complete, as the case may be—groundwater maps to
identify safe aquifers that are protected from the penetration of
arsenic via clay barriers.147 These objectives would be facilitated by
an enforceable Groundwater Act, as argued for in Section 2.2.3.
Further policy recommendations by APSU include an update
of the IPAMB with cost-sharing provisions for installations
(including payment for the caretakers), a more realistic estimate of
the number of families served by individual technology
implementations, and updated recommendations on technology
types given new data from various studies that have been
conducted on their efficacy148—all sensible suggestions which have
not appeared in an updated Implementation Plan.

Id. at 29.
RAIHANA & HUSSAIN, supra note 94, at 107 (―The villagers opted for deeper
tube-well [sic] as a long-term solution.‖).
144 KABIR & HOWARD, supra note 118, at 33 (noting that ―deeper, older and
safer aquifers need to be identified‖).
145 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 179–80 (addressing the practical and social
concerns of a large-scale deep tube-well implementation program).
146 Id. at 180.
147 KABIR & HOWARD, supra note 118, at 33.
148 Id.
142
143
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2.3. The Ignored Problem: Soil
In the 1990s, an analytical chemist named Dipankar
Chakraborti149 observed that arsenic content in toenails and hair
were much higher than one would expect, given the supposed
quantities of arsenic people were consuming through drinking
water; people were being poisoned by some other source.150
A large quantity of groundwater from shallow tube-wells is
being used in fields for irrigation.151 Between 30% and 40% of the
net cultivable area of Bangladesh is under irrigation and more than
60% of the irrigation need is met from groundwater.152
Groundwater use is particularly pronounced during the dry
season, when vast quantities of water are pumped up to flood
paddy fields; the arsenic in this water is left to collect atop the soil
until, in the fortunate cases, monsoon floods wash away the
contaminated sediment.153 This irrigation practice was personally
observed by Meharg, who stated: ―The poison was being liberally
poured onto the most precious of all the delta‘s natural resources:
its soil. Not only has the miracle of clean water been turned sour—
the agricultural revolution is slowly poisoning the land.‖154 What
is most alarming is that this problem seems to be largely ignored
by both the Bangladeshi government and NGOs, despite the fact
that arsenic in the food-chain may very well cause more serious
long-term problems than arsenic in drinking-water155 and arsenic
in soil will inflict long-term damage on Bangladesh‘s chance for
recovery.
A 2003 joint study conducted by the Bangladesh University of
Engineering and the United Nations University on the subject of
Bangladesh concluded that ―[a]rsenic builds up in topsoil when
MEHARG, supra note 7, at 18.
See S. M. Imamul Huq & Ravi Naidu, Arsenic in Groundwater of Bangladesh:
Contamination in the Food Chain, in ARSENIC CONTAMINATION: BANGLADESH
PERSPECTIVE 203, 206–07 (M. Feroze Ahmed ed., 2003) (discussing the possible
transfer of arsenic to humans from various forms of food, including water-soilcrops, which could account for the additional levels of arsenic contamination
above what is found in the water supply).
151 See Rahman Interview, supra note 24, at 12 (citing studies regarding
groundwater use in irrigation).
152 Huq & Naidu, supra note 150, at 204.
153 See MEHARG, supra note 7, at 18.
154 Id.
155 Rahman Interview, supra note 24, at 12 (noting the looming but seemingly
ignored danger of food chain contamination).
149
150
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irrigated with arsenic contaminated water.‖156 Agricultural soils‘
arsenic content ―increases during irrigation with contaminated
water but it is reduced during [the] post-irrigation period,‖ most
likely due in part to leaching by flood or rainwater.157 While the
study concluded that ―[a]rsenic content of soil does not build up to
a critical level that affects growth of crops,‖158 there has been more
recent concern that arsenic may reduce the yield of rice.159
Arsenic collects in vegetables, particularly in leaves of lowgrowing leafy plants160 like arum, gourd leaf, amaranathus, and
ipomea161, as well as roots, like bitter gourd.162 Additionally,
papaya, tomato, mayalu, green chili, jack fruit, and parwar contain
significantly higher quantities of arsenic when irrigated by arseniccontaminated water than when grown in unaffected areas.163
Arsenic in wheat and rice is mostly concentrated in roots and
straws.164 As much as 1830 ppb arsenic has been found in rice
grown in Bangladesh; 200 ppb is considered normal.165 Presence of
the element in rice grain varies according to the variety of rice
being considered.166 Arsenic is also found in grass used as
fodder,167 which is fed to livestock and potentially transferred to
meat.168
Bangladeshi cooking practices are also tainted: rice stalks used
for cooking can have higher concentrations of arsenic than
contaminated drinking water and people breathe in arsenic-tainted

156 M. Feroze Ahmed, Arsenic Contamination: Regional and Global Scenario, in
ARSENIC CONTAMINATION: BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE, supra note 150, at 1, 4.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 RAIHANA & HOSSAIN, supra note 94, at 27 box 3.3.
160 See Huq & Naidu, supra note 150, at 215.
161 See Indira Chakravarty et al., Arsenic in Food Chain—A Study on Both Raw
and Cooked Food, in ARSENIC CONTAMINATION: BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE, supra note
150, at 227, 236.
162 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 18.
163 See Chakravarty et al., supra note 161, at 235 (providing data that supports
the contention that vegetables contain higher levels of arsenic when irrigated with
arsenic-contaminated water).
164 Id. at 236.
165 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 18.
166 Chakravarty et al., supra note 161, at 236.
167 Id.
168 See Huq & Naidu, supra note 150, at 214 (speculating on the possibility of
arsenic lingering in meat after livestock eats contaminated fodder).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss3/3

SARWAR.DOC

2011]

3/18/2011 9:26 PM

ARSENIC MITIGATION IN BANGLADESH

869

fumes when they cook.169 Contaminated rice can contribute as
much or more arsenic to the diet as a tube-well—especially where
it is cooked in contaminated water.170
Indeed, many types of food retain arsenic through use of
arsenic-contaminated water in cooking,171 including tea, diluted
milk, dal, potato curry, and certain preparations of rice.172 Oddly
enough, a separate study found that arsenic is not retained in lentil
soup, one of the staple foods of rural Bangladesh cuisine.173
The contaminated soil is perhaps the most urgent reason why
Bangladesh needs to seriously pursue the drastic reduction of
groundwater use. Getting people to stop drinking tube-well water
is necessary but insufficient; the Bangladesh government must
eliminate the use of tube-well water to irrigate rice paddies.
As Meharg notes, ―[t]he quantities of water required for
cultivation are so vast that it would be uneconomical to rid the
water of arsenic.‖174 The solution, then, is to secure sufficient
arsenic-free surface water—from river water and ponds—to halt
the poisoning and destruction of Bangladesh‘s agricultural
foundations. As will be discussed in Section 4, this might be done
through the use of international law and large-scale surface water
augmentation projects.
Sadly, even this is only a partial solution—cessation of the use
of tube-well water for irrigation would merely leave the poison
where the food grows and arsenic present in the soil would
remain.175 Still, this problem cannot be solved merely through
internal means. Surface water is needed. If Bangladesh is to rely
more on surface water, it needs to turn to international law.

Rahman Interview, supra note 24, at 12.
MEHARG, supra note 7, at 18.
171 Huq & Naidu, supra note 150, at 222 (charting the arsenic levels in a
variety of foods cooked with arsenic-contaminated water as opposed to grown
with arsenic-contaminated water).
172 Chakravarty et al., supra note 161, at 237–38 (cataloguing heightened levels
of arsenic in common Bangladeshi foods when prepared with arseniccontaminated water).
173 Id. at 239.
174 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 18.
175 Id. at 19.
169
170
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OBSTACLES TO RELYING ON SURFACE WATER

The goal articulated by the Bangladeshi government of
encouraging its population to again rely on surface water is not
easy to accomplish. The logistical and social difficulties are
explored in Section 2.2 which details the way in which the
country‘s arsenic mitigation efforts—largely consisting of attempts
to install temporary water provision alternatives—have
encountered difficulties.
Additionally, as noted by UNICEF, reliance on surface water is
only truly feasible after dealing with what is possibly a larger
problem of waterborne microbial contaminants,176 a threat
Bangladesh faced in the past and hoped to resolve by turning to
groundwater. A sudden switch to surface water would force
Bangladesh to revisit early decades of mass sickness and death
caused by drinking contaminated river water.
These problems are, however, in a sense, ―luxury‖ problems.
They are only addressed if there is water available in the first place.
For a truly effective surface water solution, Bangladesh must first
(or at the very least simultaneously) work to secure a sufficient
quantity of surface water.
This is especially important because Bangladesh‘s agricultural
reliance on groundwater must also be transferred elsewhere. The
concern regarding biological waterborne disease, fortunately, is
lessened in the context of water used for agriculture. Microbes in
harvested food are dealt with at least partially through cooking,
cleaning and processing crops. However, arsenic that has collected
in the soil will continue to infiltrate the food chain. As discussed in
Section 2.3, the poison has a tenacious tendency to linger. Arsenic
is a long-term problem.
Given Bangladesh‘s consumption and agricultural needs, we
can conclude that for arsenic mitigation practices to be effective,
more surface water will be necessary for the population to use. If
more surface water is not attained, the population, faced with the
lack of surface water, will turn in its thirst to generously-provided
and readily-available poisonous groundwater.

176 See id. at 178 (quoting a 1999 UNICEF report, which noted that ―[h]astily
and indiscriminately switching back to surface water across the country without
strong pollution control measures in place will most likely do more harm than
good to the people of Bangladesh‖).
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In short, Bangladesh, must ensure that there is enough surface
water upon which to apply newly designed sanitation technology
and processes.
This is easier said than done. This section will examine the
roadblocks Bangladesh faces in attempting to secure such water. It
will (1) consider the difficulties of negotiating for more water
through treaties, and (2) identify the dangers of upper riparian
damming practices such as the upcoming Indian IBWT Project,
which will exacerbate Bangladesh‘s plight.
3.1. Difficulty of Securing Surface Water Through Treaty Negotiation
There are many rivers that traverse between India and
Bangladesh.177 Despite this abundance, there is only one treaty178
177 There are fifty-seven transboundary rivers in Bangladesh; fifty-four are
shared with India. Bangladesh, supra note 11. The remaining three are shared with
Myanmar. Id.
178 There seems to have been progress forging a second treaty that will
govern the waters of the Teesta River, one of the transboundary rivers that
Bangladesh and India share. See Talks with B’desh on River Water Sharing,
HINDUSTAN TIMES (India), Jan. 10, 2011, http://www.hindustantimes.com/Talkswith-B-desh-on-river-water-sharing/H1-Article1-648634.aspx (reporting that talks
from 2010 resumed between India and Bangladesh regarding sharing common
rivers and noting the Bangladeshi expectation of a 15-year interim treaty on
Teesta, as well as the likelihood of discussions on ―a short-term treaty‖ for sharing
the waters of the southern Feni river). Teesta has suffered from reduced flows
during the last quarter century. India, Bangladesh to Discuss Teesta River Water
Sharing, OUTLOOK INDIA, Jan. 4, 2010, http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx
?672113 (―[T]he flow of the river weakened significantly in the last 24 years for
Gajoldoba barrage and some dams in the upstream Indian region. In February
and March, it comes down to less than 1,000 cubic feet per second, from 5,000
cubic feet per second in December and January . . .‖). As yet, no treaty on Teesta
has been signed. Anisur Rahman, India Dominates B’desh Political, Foreign Scene in
2010, OUTLOOK INDIA, Dec. 23, 2010, http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx
?706099 (―[T]wo sides were yet to strike even an interim deal on the issue . . . .‖).
This is despite signs of progress throughout 2010. In January 2010, India and
Bangladesh held secretary-level talks to reach an agreement on the Teesta treaty,
and Bangladesh indicated that it was amenable to a temporary deal to establish a
foundation for the desired long-term deal. See India, Bangladesh to Discuss Teesta
River Water Sharing, supra (describing both parties‘ commitment towards
establishing an agreement, if not a treaty); see also Govt Wants Deals On All
Common Rivers, BDNEWS24.COM (Bangl.), Jan. 23, 2010, http://bdnews24.com
/details.php?id=151790&cid=2 (noting that there was an express desire to reach
an agreement on all rivers). In March 2010, the Joint Rivers Commission (―JRC‖)
(see infra notes 216-22 and accompanying text for more information regarding the
JRC) met after a years-long hiatus to discuss the Teesta river and exchange drafts
of water sharing agreements, and the outlook was optimistic. See, e.g., India,
Bangladesh to Discuss Teesta Water-Sharing, HINDU (India), Mar. 17, 2010,
http://beta.thehindu.com/news/national/article253918.ece
(discussing
an
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to date that governs one river system (at minimum179). This leaves
Bangladesh in a vulnerable position. India and upper riparians can
argue—due to a lack of concretely governing international law180—
that they need not pay attention to lower riparian needs when
determining what to do with rivers that are arguably unregulated
by any treaty. The obvious solution for Bangladesh would be to
enter into treaty negotiations for these rivers.
Unfortunately, as Meharg has observed, any goal to obtain
water from transboundary rivers via political negotiations with
India is complicated.181 For one thing, it seems difficult to bring
upper riparians to the treaty bargaining table, because they have
no incentive (by virtue of geographic or economic realities) to
negotiate a water sharing treaty when they can choose to take as

upcoming JRC meeting to review Teesta water-sharing); India, Bangladesh
Exchange Drafts [Accords] on Teesta Water-Sharing, TIMES OF INDIA, Mar. 20, 2010,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-Bangladesh-exchange-draftaccords-on-Teesta-water-sharing/articleshow/5703608.cms (reporting on the
significant breakthrough in negotiations for the two nations when they exchanged
draft water-sharing agreements); India, Bangladesh Hold Talks on River Water, SIFY
NEWS (India), Mar. 18, 2010, http://sify.com/news/india-bangladesh-hold-talkson-river-water-news-national-kdsrkecdagb.html (describing Teesta interim
agreement talks between Bangladesh and India); India-Bangladesh Water Sharing
Agreement on Teesta Soon, BOMBAYNEWS.NET (India), Mar. 20, 2010, http://www
.bombaynews.net/story/614333 (reporting that India and Bangladesh were
moving closer to a Teesta water-sharing agreement); Secys Asked to Examine
Dhaka’s Draft on Teesta, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Mar. 20, 2010, http://www
.thedailystar.net/newDesign/latest_news.php?nid=22780 (noting that talks on the
Teesta water treaty had intensified). However, something stalled the process, and
Bangladesh ultimately expressed frustration at the lack of progress. See Anisur
Rahman, B’desh Wants to Expedite Water Cooperation with India, OUTLOOK INDIA,
Nov. 7, 2010, http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx?700312 (―Peeved by the
inordinate delay in reaching agreements on water sharing with India, Bangladesh
Foreign Minister Dipu Moni has said that at this rate the two neighbours would
need ‗a millennium‘ to sign deals on 54 common rivers.‖); Kamran Reza
Chowdhury, Dhaka Presses for JRC Talks on Teesta Deal, BDNEWS24.COM (Bangl.),
Nov. 21, 2009, http://bdnews24.com/details.php?id=147503&cid=2 (reporting
the difficulties of arranging productive meetings with India on the matter of water
sharing).
179 It is possible that the 1996 Ganges Treaty governs, to some extent, the use
and sharing agreements of other transboundary rivers. See generally discussion
infra Section 4.1.2 discussing protection under the 1996 Ganges Treaty.
180 International law might impose obligations upon upper riparian nations
and India. See generally discussion infra Section 4.1.3 (discussing regulation of
international rivers and recent trends).
181 See MEHARG, supra note 7, at 19 (observing that the construction of dams to
divert water flowing from transnational rivers has been a source of political
tension in Bangladesh‘s history).
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much of the water as they need or want without significant
negative consequences from the lower riparian. In theory, in the
case of India, there is a legal obligation to come to the negotiating
table imposed on both it and Bangladesh by the 1996 Ganges
Treaty,182 though the extent or enforceability of this obligation is
unclear. Thus far, it has seemed somewhat ineffectual: to date
there has been limited success compelling India to adhere to this
obligation, and lack of clarity as to whether Bangladesh has made
sufficient effort to impose adherence to this term of the 1996
Treaty.183 Some observers also claim an obligation to utilize the
1996 Treaty as a template of a ―framework‖ for future treaties184 —a
contention that is arguably limited in its benefits.
182 See generally 1996 Ganges Treaty, supra note 30, art. IX (indicating that both
governments agree to conclude water-sharing agreements with respect to other
rivers).
183 We can point to several pieces of evidence supporting this. First, the Joint
Rivers Commission—an organization that is a focal point for negotiating efforts
between India and Bangladesh (for more information regarding the JRC, see infra
notes 216–22 and accompanying text)—meets inconsistently. While part of this is
reluctance on India‘s part, some note that the functionality of the group seems to
be dictated by prevailing political mood in Bangladesh:

The JRC could not meet even once in three consecutive years during the
late 80s because there was no political interest on the Indian side (the JRC
is supposed to meet four or more times a year). When Awami League
(AL) came into power in mid 1996, the JRC met several times and a 30year Ganges Treaty could be drafted and signed within a few months of
AL‘s coming into power.
Shamim Ahsan, India’s Giant River-Link Project: Will Bangladesh Dry Up?, STAR
MAG., Oct. 10, 2003,
http://www.thedailystar.net/magazine/2003/10/02
/coverstory.htm. Second, we can look at the markedly slow process of
negotiating the Teesta River sharing agreement, which, as noted before, has been
a longstanding concern. Despite apparent activity in 2010, negotiations have not
culminated in a treaty or interim deal. Rahman, India Dominates B’desh Political,
Foreign Scene in 2010, supra note 178. Note, however, that India has committed to
working with Bangladesh to forge new treaties and agreements to ensure
preservation of Bangladesh‘s interests. See Khondkar A. Saleque, Ice Melting in
Indo-Bangla Relation, ENERGY BANGLA, (Jan. 13, 2010, 1:21 AM),
http://www.energybangla.com/index.php?mod=article&cat=SomethingtoSay&a
rticle=2357 (describing the various commitments India made in January 2010
regarding water-sharing issues including and beyond the sharing of the Teesta
River, such as: a promise of no harm from the Tipamiukh Dam; a commitment to
working out issues related to the Feni, Muhuri, Khowai, Dharala and Dudkumar
rivers; the dredging of the Ichamati river; and the protection of the Mahananda,
Karotoa, Nagar, Kulik, Atrai, Dharala and Feni rivers).
184 See, e.g., Surya P. Subedi, Hydro-Diplomacy in South Asia: The Conclusion of
the Mahakali and Ganges River Treaties, 93 AM. J. INT‘L L. 953, 960 (1999) (arguing that
since the 1996 Treaty also ―lays down the . . . principles . . . of future agreements
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As further evidence of the difficulty of relying upon treaty
negotiation, it is worthwhile to note that the 1996 Ganges Treaty—
despite its benefits—is flawed in fundamental ways. The history of
the formation of the 1996 Ganges Treaty highlights a potentially
grim set of conclusions regarding these flaws: overwhelmingly
negative effects of bargaining inequities between Bangladesh and
its neighbors result in the absence of important water-sharing
provisions, effective dispute resolution mechanisms, and perhaps
necessitate the use of third-party arbitration.
3.1.1.

Impact of the 1996 Ganges Treaty on Subsequent Treaties

Article IX of the Ganges Treaty directs the governments of
India and Bangladesh to conclude water-sharing agreements for
other common rivers.185 It directs the two countries to conclude
these treaties with ―due consideration to the principles of equity,
fairness and no harm.‖186
Unfortunately, this aspect of the Treaty has seen little
enforcement. Note how the mandate of Article IX is remarkably
vague; it gives no guidelines or structure to the obligation of
creating new treaties. It does not indicate when or under what
circumstances new water-sharing agreements for the numerous
other rivers between India and Bangladesh should be forged.
There seems to be nothing in the treaty‘s text preventing India
from delaying the process indefinitely, or from compelling an
incompetent or distracted Bangladesh from neglecting its surface
water interests.
Noting this conscious decision to include language whose
scope lies beyond the technical matter of sharing water for just the
Ganges, some observers—as mentioned before—argue that the
treaty is a ―framework‖ treaty that governs future water-sharing
agreements between Bangladesh and India. This is a valuable
observation, but might be of limited usefulness for several reasons.
First, the argument presumes that India will come to the
bargaining table to form new treaties in the first place, which, as
noted before, is not necessarily a reasonable given. Indeed,
because India seems to have little to gain from such treaties, it is

on other common rivers;‖ it is a ―framework treaty,‖ in addition to having a
―technical character‖).
185 1996 Ganges Treaty, supra note 30, art. IX.
186 Id.
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unclear how Bangladesh could even begin to make a ―framework‖
treaty argument.
Second, it is unclear—given the Treaty‘s shortcomings, which
will be discussed in Section 3.1.2—whether the Ganges Treaty is a
worthwhile framework to utilize. As observers have noted, there
are some attractive aspects. One is the Treaty‘s use and placement
of the ―no harm‖ principle. This principle—sometimes called the
―obligation not to cause appreciable harm‖—is an international
custom187 that limits a state‘s right to act in a manner that impinges
upon the rights of other states. In other words, the principle seems
to imply that a lower riparian might assert rights in the event that
an upper riparian is inflicting significant damage to it. The Ganges
Treaty specifically includes mention of the ―no harm‖ rule as well
as the principle of equitable use,188 and, rather unusually,189
187 Abu R. M. Khalid has suggested that the principle ―receives wide
recognition today as a general principle of international law,‖ having been
articulated in the soft-law Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment and
applied in the Trail Smelter Arbitration between the United States and Canada.
Abu R. M. Khalid, The Interlinking of Rivers Project in India and International Water
Law: An Overview, 3 CHINESE J. INT‘L L. 553, 563 (2004). The former‘s articulation of
the no harm rule can be found in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration:

States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Action Taken by the Conference 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48
/14/Rev.1 (1973). In the latter, meanwhile, the tribunal, considering damage
caused to the United States—via air pollution—by a smelter in Canada, found
that:
[U]nder the principles of international law . . . no State has the right to
use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury
by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is
established by clear and convincing evidence.
Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), Decision, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (Apr. 1938).
188 See infra notes 208–13, 297–303, and accompanying text.
189 I characterize this as unusual only because the Treaty seems to explicitly
buck the trend identified by some observers of favoring equitable use principles
over the no harm rule. Subedi points to the (un-ratified) 1997 UN Watercourse
Convention, which downplays the no harm rule and emphasizes the principle of
reasonable and equitable use. Subedi, supra note 184, at 961. See also Convention
on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, arts. 5–7,
May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997).
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appears to favor neither.190 Thus, if Bangladesh were able to bring
India back to the table for new treaty negotiations regarding the
many shared rivers that can currently be used with few
international legal ramifications, it might have at its disposal the
ability to incorporate the no harm rule into subsequent agreements.
Again, as will be discussed in Section 3.1.2, given the Ganges
Treaty‘s shortcomings, perhaps this advantage is an insufficient
incentive to keep the Treaty as anything but a lessons-learned
document.191 While the Treaty was indeed a breakthrough on
many levels, it might do Bangladesh well to start fresh for other
rivers.
Note, finally, the argument that the Ganges Treaty is a
―framework‖ treaty—aside from potentially being moot—is also
weakened by the final sentence in the preamble, which indicates
provisions of the treaty are not meant to give rise ―to any general
principles of law or precedent.‖192 India would almost certainly
utilize this clause to argue against allowing Bangladesh to use the
Ganges Treaty for its benefit (and potentially to the detriment of
India) in future treaty formation.
3.1.2.

Oversights and Flaws in the 1996 Ganges Treaty

As Meharg notes, the construction of dams to divert and
regulate the Ganges River has been a source of political tension
between India and Bangladesh since Bangladesh gained
independence.193 The Ganges Treaty was a significant step in the
relations between the two countries. It is a long-term solution to
190 See 1996 Ganges Treaty, supra note 30, art. IX (stating that the parties are
―guided by the principles of equity, fairness and no harm‖). Subedi suggests that
this means the two principles are given ―equal footing,‖ noting:

If the no-harm rule and equitable utilization are given equal weight, a
lower riparian state in a parched region with fully utilized rivers might
claim that any use of the watercourse by an upper riparian state would
be harmful to it. This is one reason why an upper riparian state is likely
to benefit more from adoption of the international law principle of
equitable and reasonable utilization than from the principle of no harm.
Subedi, supra note 184, at 961.
191 Further, as Subedi notes, ―[t]he parties‘ agreement to conclude other
treaties, however, does not extend to such matters as the management,
conservation and prevention of pollution of their common rivers.‖ Subedi, supra
note 184, at 960.
192 1996 Ganges Treaty, supra note 30, at 523.
193 See MEHARG, supra note 7, at 18–19.
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what had been years of conflict: a thirty-year194 agreement
renewable by mutual consent,195 and reviewed every five years (or
as required by either party).196 The arrangement basically attempts
to ensure that Bangladesh is not entirely deprived of water during
the region‘s dry seasons as a result of the Farakka Barrage, a
structure that was built—without Bangladesh‘s consent—to allow
India to divert flows from the Ganges River.197
Some observers consider the treaty to be a breakthrough
achievement, one that, as speculated by James Kraska, injected a
―sense of fairness and equality into the diplomacy‖ between
Bangladesh and India.198 Like other water-sharing agreements in
South Asia, the treaty potentially helped strengthen political ties,
ameliorated regional tensions, and reduced the likelihood of war
by inserting ―new ingredients‖ into long-standing disputes:
assurance, verification, institution-building, process-building,
constituent building, and principle development.199
It was,
according to some, ―a great achievement in the history of IndoBangladesh negotiations on the Ganges,‖ and removed a ―major
irritant‖ between the two nations.200
Despite these rather lofty benefits, the Ganges Treaty has its
flaws.
For one thing, the agreement may assume that a higher level of
water is available in the Ganges River during the dry season than
actually is – an assumption that was revealed as seemingly false as

1996 Ganges Treaty, supra note 30, art. XII.
Id.
196 See id. art. X. A joint survey on Padma flow began on January 1, 2011—to
take place 6 days a week, until May 31—pursuant to the Ganges Treaty. See Joint
survey on Padma flow, BDNEWS24.COM (Bangl.), Jan. 1, 2011, http://bdnews24.com
/details.php?cid=2&id=183204.
197 See Khan, supra note 3, at 470 (noting that the aim of the Ganges Treaty is
to ensure that Bangladesh receives water during the region‘s dry seasons). This
water is diverted into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly river of West Bengal to flush silts
and to improve navigability of the Port of Calcutta. Id. at 471.
198 See James Kraska, Sustainable Development is Security: The Role of
Transboundary River Agreements as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) in South
Asia, 28 YALE J. INT‘L L. 465, 495 (2003).
199 Id. at 492 (listing beneficial elements introduced into the South Asian
geopolitical realm as a result of international river agreements).
200 See Khan, supra note 3, at 470.
194
195
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early as 1997,201 and which has not been adequately addressed due
to shortcomings in the Treaty‘s dispute resolution provisions.202
The impact of this flaw is amplified by the Treaty‘s lack of a
flow augmentation plan, which would have resulted in a
collaborative project between the countries to increase the flow of
the Ganges by leveraging other surface water resources.203 The
Ganges Treaty quietly acknowledges the correction of this
conceptual incompleteness as a worthy future goal.204 The lack of
such a plan is particularly tragic because it was the subject of a
protracted and consistent disagreement between India and
Bangladesh, and resulted in a delay in the Treaty‘s formation.205
Additionally, some have noted that the Ganges Treaty is
―overwhelmingly concerned‖ with sharing water during dry
seasons and does not recognize the fact that the river floods
severely in the monsoon season.206 India diverts water away from
Bangladesh when the river runs low and then uses Farakka to
allow the Ganges to flood Bangladesh when the river runs
destructively high during the monsoon season.207
Note that attempts to fix these flaws are theoretically possible
through the dispute resolution mechanisms contained within the
Treaty. However, it can be argued that these mechanisms are also

201 See Salman M.A. Salman & Kishor Uprety, Hydro-Politics in South Asia: A
Comparative Analysis of the Mahakali and the Ganges Treaties, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J.
295, 327-28 (1999) (detailing Bangladesh‘s 1997 claims regarding the depleted
flows of the Ganges, and India‘s reaction).
202 See id. at 337 (―[W]hen the Ganges flow was below the thresholds specified
in the Ganges Treaty, each of the countries . . . insisted on an interpretation of its
relevant provisions in ways that suited them most. This obviously led to nonresolution and increased tension between the countries.‖).
203 See id. at 330.
204 See 1996 Ganges Treaty, supra note 30, art. IX (―The two Governments
recognise the need to cooperate with each other in finding a solution to the longterm problem of augmenting the flows of the Ganga/Ganges during the dry
season.‖).
205 See Khan, supra note 3, at 462–69 (detailing the role augmentation had in
the discussions between Bangladesh and India, its delaying effect upon the
proceedings, and its ultimate ―delinking‖ from the issue of sharing).
206 See Khalid, supra note 187, at 560.
207 See id. (noting that India has ―showed substantial efforts‖ to ensure its
control on lean season flow but has ―failed to demonstrate the same degree of
enthusiasm to get its proportionate share of the devastating monsoon season
water flow‖); MEHARG, supra note 7, at 19 (―During the dry season India siphons
off the precious Ganges waters; during the flood seasons it opens the gates,
unleashing torrents of water into Bangladesh.‖).
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the largest flaw built into the 1996 Ganges Treaty. Due to reliance
on political negotiations, these mechanisms are stacked in favor of
India.
The Ganges Treaty relies, in part, on an equitable utilization
principle,208 which was articulated in the UN Convention on the
Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses
(―1997 Watercourse Convention‖).209 It states that waters are to be
―used and developed . . . taking into account the interests of the
watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate protection
of the watercourse.‖210 As can be seen, the doctrine maintains
seemingly purposeful vagueness and a lack of concrete rights to
water use.211 It encourages, instead, that rights be assigned on a
case-by-case basis. Some scholars have argued that this vagueness
is in place in order to eliminate a sense of entitlement to water and
encourage negotiations.212 Unfortunately for Bangladesh, while
this does leave the door open for the country to negotiate its way to
more rights and a fairer distribution of water based upon its needs,
this door is not easily traversed, given the unevenness in
bargaining power between India and Bangladesh.213
We can see the embrace of negotiation as an equitable solution
in the dispute resolution mechanisms of the Ganges Treaty: they
ultimately fall back upon the respective country‘s political powers.
Article IV of the Treaty establishes a Joint Committee consisting of
equal numbers of representatives nominated by each government
for issues of dispute resolution.214 Article VII dictates that disputes
related to the operation of the Farakka Barrage or the Treaty that
208 Analysis of this principle—and suggestions regarding ways in which it
can be used to Bangladesh‘s advantage—are discussed infra Section 4.1.3.
209 See generally Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, supra note 189.
210 Id. art. 5, para. 1.
211 Michael Keene, The Failings of the Tri-State Water Negotiations: Lessons to be
Learned from International Law, 32 GA. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 473, 495–96 (2004) (noting
that the doctrine of equitable utilization lacks both specificity and permanent
rights to water use).
212 See id. at 496 (―Parties to a discussion who believe that they possess
inalienable rights are liable to be uncompromising. Concrete rights to water
usage create a feeling of entitlement that can be stifling to negotiation.‖).
213 See generally id. at 496–97 (detailing how the vague parameters and flexible
standards of rights under the doctrine of equitable utilization allow for equitable
negotiations in cases in which the parties have relatively similar bargaining
power).
214 See 1996 Ganges Treaty, supra note 30, art. IV.
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cannot be resolved by the Joint Committee float over to the IndoBangladesh Joint Rivers Commission (―JRC‖) for resolution.215
The JRC is an older entity that was signed into existence in
November 1972,216 after Bangladesh‘s independence, and played a
central role in the formation of the Ganges Treaty.217 Its purpose is
to work together ―in harnessing the rivers common to both the
countries for the benefit of the peoples of the two countries,‖ and
―to ensure the most effective joint efforts in maximizing the
benefits of common river systems.‖218 However, the JRC sits only
occasionally—most recently, as noted before,219 after a particularly
prolonged delay220 to attempt to hash out a water sharing
agreement for the sharing of the Teesta River221—and is considered
by some as ineffective.222 The Treaty perhaps contemplates this
Id. art. VII.
See generally Statute of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission
(1972),
available
at
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents
/regionaldocs/indo-bangladesh.html (providing the text of the Statute of the
Indo-Banldadesh Joint Rivers Commission, which was signed on November 24,
1972 in Dhaka).
217 See generally Khan, supra note 3, at 462–70 (providing a detailed
chronological account of the JRC‘s role in treaty negotiations between India and
Bangladesh, including its dormancy and reactivation in the early 1990s).
218 Statute of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission (1972).
219 See supra note 178.
220 See Chowdhury, supra note 178 (reporting that ―the commission had failed
to hold any talks for the last six years‖). Note that this delay occurred despite the
discussion of important matters during the previous meeting of the JRC. See
Balaji Reddy, India and Bangladesh Disagree on Teesta Water and Construction of
Tipaimukh Dam—Source of Another Round of Confrontation?, INDIA DAILY, Sept. 22,
2005, http://www.indiadaily.com/editorial/4673.asp (describing the discussions
that took place during the September 2005 ministerial JRC meeting).
221 See supra note 178 (noting progress forging a second treaty that will
govern the Teesta River despite stalled attempts in the past).
222 See Khalid, supra note 187, at 560 (―In actuality, the JRC has been almost
ineffective for a long period and sits only occasionally.‖). This infrequency of
meetings occurs reportedly despite protests from Bangladesh. See Hemayetuddin
Ahmed, Foreign Policy Conundrum: India Factor, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Oct. 31, 2009,
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=111986 (―There
had been no meetings of the JRC at all for the last four years. Repeated reminders
for the meetings and reportedly SOS from Bangladesh side had gone in vain.‖).
See also Ahsan, supra note 183 (questioning the efficacy of the JRC and providing
various suggestions to fulfill its conceptual potential: public dissemination of
activities and functions, to increase accountability and credibility; regular
collection and sharing of data on the quantity and quality of common waters; and
remedial measures to make it a more forceful recommending body, including
reducing the number of engineers as part of its required makeup, in order to
move away from overly technical solutions).
215
216
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and transfers the dispute settlement power—in the event that
neither the Joint Committee nor the JRC can come to a resolution—
to the political authority of the two countries.223 This is instead of
opting for a more impartial dispute resolution framework such as
independent arbitration—which, as Salman and Uprety note,
maintains the advantages of negotiation and works quite well in
the context of India and Nepal under the Mahakali Treaty, but
does not leave the weaker country entirely vulnerable to the
whims of the stronger.224
3.1.3.

Overwhelming Effects of Bargaining Inequity

The discussion in Section 3.1.2 regarding ill-designed dispute
resolution mechanisms in the 1996 Ganges Treaty brings to light a
general concern that Bangladesh must deal with in any attempt to
negotiate water sharing from upstream—bargaining inequities.
This is perhaps particularly true when the negotiating parties are
not similarly situated from an economic and military standpoint.
The negotiation of the 1996 Ganges Treaty exemplifies how
difficult such negotiations can be.
The story of the Treaty begins with an Indian structure that
embodies the bargaining inequities between the nations: the
Farakka Barrage. The Farakka Barrage represents the type of
control India can exert by virtue of its comparative economic and
military might and its position as an upper riparian. India was
(and continues to be) in the position to drown or parch its neighbor
as it wished (and wishes). Since the Ganges Treaty was a response
to this type of power, it is reasonable to glean that the final product
is somewhat lopsided.
The Farakka Barrage, a 1.4 mile (2,245 meter) irrigation dam,225
was built 11 miles above stream from the border of Bangladesh.226
223 The Treaty states that the dispute will be turned over ―to the two
Governments which shall meet urgently at the appropriate level to resolve it by
mutual consent.‖ 1996 Ganges Treaty, supra note 30, art. VII. See infra Section
3.1.3 for a discussion regarding why relying upon political processes might not be
ideal.
224 See generally Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 337–38 (comparing the
presence of an arbitration mechanism in the Mahakali Treaty favorably to the lack
of such a mechanism in the Ganges Treaty).
225 MINISTRY OF WATER RES., THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION BILL 2004 OF THE
FARAKKA BARRAGE PROJECT, REPLY OF ITEM NO.4 OF CHAPTER-II 2 (India), available at
http://wrmin.nic.in/writereaddata/linkimages/fb_rtia9734330785.pdf.
226 Khan, supra note 3, at 460–61.
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It was designed to divert 40,000 cusecs of a river227 whose normal
flow was, at the time, assumed to be as high as 50,000 to 55,000
cusecs during the dry season228 (an estimate shown to be
potentially unrepresentative229). The intention was not sinister on
the part of India—the primary purpose of Farakka was to divert
water into the Hooghly River to improve the navigability of
Calcutta port and prevent it from silting.230
Regardless of the efficacy of the dam and its purported goals,231
Bangladesh suffered downstream of Farakka. In our limited
MINISTRY OF WATER RES., supra note 225, at 2.
Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 305.
229 Id. at 327 (indicating that actual water flow according to Bangladesh was
considerably lower than the amount estimated as early as 1997).
230 This goal was confirmed by India‘s Ministry of Water Resources in
response to an order to release information to the public pursuant to India‘s Right
to Information Act. MINISTRY OF WATER RES., supra note 225, at 1. Other goals
were to counteract high salinity in the water and to provide Calcutta with water
for irrigation, domestic, and municipal purposes. Salman & Uprety, supra note
201, at 304.
231 India‘s Ministry of Water Resources claims:
227
228

With the completion of the Farakka Barrage, silt free water now flows
throughout the year in the river Hooghly. This has increased the
navigable depth in the riverine approach of the port and it enables to
receive large size ships and handle bigger volume of cargo, thereby
improving the economy of the vast hinterland.
MINISTRY OF WATER RES., supra note 225, at 2. However, note that the project was
pursued despite skepticism from various international experts—including those
within India—who doubted that periodic diversions of 40,000 cusecs could indeed
save Calcutta from silting. See Khan, supra note 3, at 470–72 (describing initial
skepticism of the Farakka Barrage‘s likelihood of success). Farakka ultimately did
not have the intended effect. Decades later, Calcutta port continues to silt. See
Sankar Ray, An Environmental Mistake in India, ASIA SENTINEL, Sept. 12, 2008,
http://asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1429&It
emid=34 (―If ever there was a lesson in the unintended effects of damming rivers,
[it is] the Farakka Barrage . . . threatening to wreak havoc on a series of
downstream villages and ultimately silt up the Kolkata harbor, the condition it
was partly designed to fix.‖); Khan, supra note 3, at 470–72 (summarizing the
subsequent evidence of Farakka‘s ultimate failure to achieve its goal of ―flushing
out‖ the Calcutta port). See also Kolkata Port: Government Support Vital, HINDU BUS.
LINE, Nov. 19, 2001, available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com
/businessline/logistic/2001/11/19/stories/0919c05s.htm (noting the flow from
Farakka‘s role on downstream silting). This is because the water from upstream
brought its own massive silt deposits, all of which were dropped behind the dam,
reducing the overall flow through Farakka. Julian Crandall Hollick, Ganges Dam
Leaves Devastating Legacy, NAT‘L PUB. RADIO, December 23, 2007, http://www
.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17357750. One observer has argued
that India acknowledged this was happening by developing Haldia, a nearby
deep sea port which is equipped for large oceangoing vessels and gradually
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context, Farakka and its periodic reduction of water in Bangladesh
during the dry season places immense pressure on the country‘s
attempts to address its arsenic crisis. It provides a significant
disincentive to encouraging true reliance on surface water and in
turn provides a disincentive to developing long-term mechanisms
for purifying and delivering surface water for consumption and
agriculture.
In a broader context—one that informs our consideration of the
bargaining inequities inherent between Bangladesh and India—
Farakka‘s operation began to cause severe drought in Bangladesh.
It reduced the flow of the Ganges drastically, a phenomenon which
adversely affected (and continues to affect) the ―hydrology, river
morphology, agriculture, domestic and municipal water supply,
fishery, forestry, industry, navigation, public health and
biodiversity‖ of the country.232 It was amidst the threat of these
outcomes (as well as during the early stages of these outcomes)
that Bangladesh attempted to work with India—for over two
decades—to form the Treaty.
The first Farakka water-sharing agreement was a short-term,
one-month arrangement in 1975, which shifted the longstanding
controversy over whether Farakka should be built in the first place
to determining the quantity of water to be shared during the dry
season.233
This shift was, in essence, coerced. India had built the dam
despite decades of objection from East Bengal (then Pakistan).
Bangladesh—a young country in the awkward position of owing
thanks to India for its help during Bangladesh‘s independence
movement and the rebuilding period afterwards234—had little
choice but to accept Farakka‘s existence. All the Bangladesh
government could hope to do was secure an assurance that it

pushes Calcutta port to obsolescence. Khan, supra note 3, at 472. However,
ironically, Haldia has also fallen prey to similar silting processes, due either to
Farakka and other Indian damming practices upstream, or a generally lower-thanexpected water availability from the Ganges. See, e.g., Silt-Choked Haldia Port Shuts
Down, TIMES OF INDIA, Sept. 16, 2009, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india
/Silt-choked-Haldia-port-shuts-down/articleshow/5015690.cms; Cargo Handling
at Haldia Port to Drop by 9 MN Tonnes This Fiscal, HINDU (India), http://beta
.thehindu.com/business/Industry/article201955.ece.
232 Khan, supra note 3, at 473.
233 Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 307.
234 Khalid, supra note 187, at 557–58.
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would not be entirely deprived of water when India chose to begin
its Ganges diversions.
The following thirsty, uncertain ―era‖ involved a purportedly
month-long test-run of the Barrage by India that continued for two
years, intervention by the UN (at Bangladesh‘s request) that
resulted in a temporary sharing agreement lasting from 1977 to
1982,235 refusal on the part of India to renew the 1977 agreement
despite Bangladesh‘s repeated requests, two flimsier ―Memoranda
of Understanding‖ (in 1982 and 1985) that did not safeguard
Bangladesh‘s interests in the event of exceptionally low Ganges
flows, and another dearth of sharing agreements for eight years
between 1985 and late 1996.236 Throughout the pre-1996 years, on
several occasions and for varying stretches of time, India withdrew
significant quantities of water from upstream as needed, leaching
Bangladesh dry.237
Over this period, the agreements were marked by a
systematically reduced share of water for Bangladesh.238 While
some of this might have been attributable to the equitable
utilization principle—which, as noted before, partially guided the
ultimate sharing arrangements in the Ganges Treaty and
emphasized ―distribution of resources in the manner that is most
beneficial to all the parties involved,‖239 or, phrased differently,
―the comprehensive best interests of both parties‖240—some
compellingly speculate that the reduction found much of its source
in India‘s bargaining advantages: the country had size, military
might, and upstream proximity in its favor.241

235 See generally Agreement Between the Government of the People‘s Republic
of Bangladesh and the Government of the Republic of India on Sharing of the
Ganges Waters at Farakka and on Augmenting its Flows, Bangl.-India, Nov. 5,
1977, 1066 U.N.T.S. 16 (detailing the terms of the Ganges water sharing agreement
from 1977 to 1982).
236 See Khan, supra note 3, at 463–69, for an in-depth review of the sequence
of events. See also Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 307–10, for a discussion of
the early agreements on the Ganges River.
237 See Khan, supra note 3, at 467–69.
238 See Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 327 (stating that Bangladesh‘s
share of water decreased from about 59% under the 1977 Agreement to
approximately 52% under the present Ganges Treaty).
239 Keene, supra note 211, at 485.
240 Id. at 488.
241 Id. at 499–500.
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Note, also, the sheer amount of time it took for a long-term
treaty to be formed—twenty-one years, from 1975 to 1996.242 Given
that this lengthy period of time was primarily damaging to
Bangladesh and less so (if at all) to India, it is reasonable to
conclude that the gap was again due to the bargaining advantages
that India possesses. India, after all, had little interest in forming a
sharing agreement. In the absence of an agreement, it had free
reign to use Farakka as it needed.
In sum, the Ganges Treaty, while beneficial to Bangladesh, was
forged with significant compromises on the part of Bangladesh due
to its bargaining disadvantages. The same problem will likely
occur in any subsequent attempts to use solo treaty negotiations to
secure surface water.243
Granted, it is unnecessarily and glumly fatalistic to dismiss all
of Bangladesh‘s attempts to negotiate with India as doomed. There
are ways of surmounting bargaining inequities. We can look to
other treaties in the region for guidance—the Indus River Treaty
between India and Pakistan, for example.244 While the bargaining
disparities are obviously on a different scale (Pakistan is larger,
more developed, and more militarily-advanced than Bangladesh),
the Indus River Treaty did find success through the use of a thirdparty arbitration apparatus for the negotiation of treaty terms.
Indeed, much of the success of the Indus River Treaty—whose
obligations have been met by both countries for the 50 years it has
been in effect, despite strained political relations and full-out
war—may be attributed to the fact that the treaty negotiations were
managed by the World Bank, an independent, theoretically
unbiased arbitrator.245 However, an arbitrator was not employed
242 Communications between the countries during this more than two-decade
gap indicate that the delay was largely due to disagreement on flow augmentation
plans. See Khan, supra note 3, at 467. Some claim India was stalling negotiations
by insisting on the linkage of the issues of flow augmentation and flow sharing
and predicating any long-term treaty on an augmentation scheme of India‘s
design. See id. at 469.
243 See supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing recent, albeit
tediously slow, attempts at drafting water sharing negotiations).
244 See generally Indus Waters Treaty 1960, India-Pak., Sept. 19, 1960, 419
U.N.T.S. 125 (defining the terms of current water sharing treaty between India
and Pakistan).
245 See Subedi, supra note 184, at 953 (attributing the success of the Indus
River Treaty to the ―wisdom and far-sightedness of [India and Pakistan‘s] political
leaders and the constructive role of mediation and conciliation played by the
World Bank‖).
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for the formation of the Ganges Treaty and the lesson from the
Treaty‘s shortcomings is worthwhile. Bangladesh, in future
―international‖ endeavors—such as agreements on the many
transboundary rivers that flow from India—should avoid acting
alone. It should instead call upon an impartial, credible, and
influential arbitrator to help.
3.1.4.

Insufficiency of Bilateral Treaties

There has been a consistent cry from some experts for multilateral, holistic, ―catchment-based‖ water management treaties for
entire hydrological systems rather than reliance on simple bilateral
treaties. The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna river system would
benefit from such an agreement,246 and Bangladesh would do well
to encourage its neighbors to enter into one. This, however, seems
an unrealistic goal. Bangladesh may consider making a vigorous
effort in international arenas by approaching organizations such as
the United Nations to bring attention to its thirsty plight, and point
to the untold efficiencies and benefits that might arise from having
a better treaty for the region—but that is approximately the extent
of what it is likely to accomplish.
The numbers support the lack of feasibility for such an
arrangement: in 1997, 124 of the 145 water treaties in the world
were bilateral.247 Twenty-one of the treaties were multilateral; two
of these multilateral treaties were ―unsigned agreements or
drafts.‖248 Experts have attributed the lack of any real attempt to
enter into a multilateral water management treaty to political and
ideological differences, as well as the varying, and seemingly
conflicting, immediate interests amongst riparian countries.249

246 Potential benefits include an increased provision of hydro-electric power,
improved navigation routes, improved water quality, and increased cooperation
in mitigating natural disasters. See ADB REPORT, supra note 73, at 6, para. 20.
247 See Jesse H. Hamner & Aaron T. Wolf, Patterns in International Water
Resource Treaties: The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, 9 COLO. J. INT‘L
ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 157, 160 (1997) (noting that the overwhelming percentage of
modern international water resource treaties are bilateral, as opposed to
multilateral).
248 Id.
249 See Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 299 (noting that in spite of the
tremendous importance of the Ganges River to the livelihood of the four riparian
countries—India, Nepal, Bangladesh, and China—they have never entered into a
water-sharing agreement because of political and ideological differences).
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Earlier, an example of this was mentioned briefly250—the flow
augmentation disagreements during the twenty-one year delay
before the 1996 Ganges Treaty. During this time, Bangladesh and
India were exchanging large-scale construction proposals to
augment the flow of the Ganges River. India‘s proposals centered
on the construction of a link-canal through Bangladesh territory to
connect the Brahmaputra River with the Ganges River at a point
above the Farakka Barrage; Bangladesh disliked these proposals,
concerned as they were with the environmental, social, political,
and economic impact of such a project. More importantly,
Bangladesh was concerned about the canal‘s potential to
exacerbate flooding during the monsoon season.251 Bangladesh
instead wished to build storage reservoirs in the upper reaches of
the Ganges in India and Nepal to ―store water during the monsoon
season for release during the dry season.‖252 India refused this
idea outright, because it involved Nepal, which it contended was
outside the scope of the negotiations.
Indeed, during those two decades, whenever Bangladesh
wanted to involve Nepal in the discussion of its proposal for
augmentation through storage mechanisms, India avoided the
issue by pleading bilateralism.253 One might interpret this refusal
on the part of India to engage in multilateral negotiations as a
strategic way to maintain its bargaining advantages. Bilateral
negotiation was perhaps preferred by India because it: (a)
prevented Nepal and Bangladesh from consolidating their
transboundary river interests (thereby gaining more leverage
against India); and (b) avoided the complications of articulating a
non-contradictory, self-benefiting water sharing theory to both its
upper and lower riparian neighbors at the same time. Imagine
India attempting to reconcile its stance on the sharing of the
Mahakali River with Nepal—defending, as a lower riparian
country, its right to use the water in accordance with its need for
the water, where the term ―need‖ is interpreted to describe
extensive socio-economic requirements—but denying Bangladesh,
250 See supra notes 205, 242 (noting the role of augmentation in the discussions
between Bangladesh and India, and its delaying effect upon the proceedings).
251 See Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 331 (discussing India and
Bangladesh‘s proposed plans to augment the flow of the Ganges River during the
dry season, and the concerns that arose out of these proposals).
252 Id.
253 Khan, supra note 3, at 478.
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as an upper riparian state, more generous access to the Ganges.
This would be awkward at best; India, in short, had no immediate
incentive to negotiate with more than one party at any given time
(though it is worthwhile to note that recently India has seemed
more amenable to the concept254).
Still, the arguments in favor of a multilateral treaty are
compelling. International drainage basins link riparian states into
a common and interdependent freshwater system that essentially
connects the encompassed nations‘ respective agricultural,
industrial, energy, and transportation sectors into an integrated
regional unit—action by one riparian nation affects the quantity
and quality of river water available to neighboring states, and
imposes direct costs on other states in the basin; basin nations
share not just a river, but also an entire ecosphere.255 While the
potential for conflict is extremely high, so too is (as is submitted by
some observers) the possibility and beneficial nature of
compromise and cooperation.256
According to some water resource experts, ignoring the
watershed as the fundamental planning unit—where the quality
and quantity of surface water and groundwater are all
interrelated—ignores hydrologic reality.257
Thus, any policy
insisting upon bilateral negotiations is not ideal.258 Some observers
claim that neither the Ganges-Brahmaputra nor the Indus River
systems have ever been managed to their full efficiency due to
mentalities that ignore the fundamental nature of the watershed.259
Another has predicted that a truly permanent solution to the
Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin difficulties will only occur
after the inclusion of all the affected watercourse states in treaty
negotiations.260

254 Bangladesh Seeks Tripartite Water Talks with Nepal, India, BDNEWS24.COM
(Bangl.), Mar. 20, 2010, http://www.bdnews24.com/details.php?id=156324
&cid=2 (―According to a press-release issued by the Bangladesh High
Commission in Delhi, India was agreeable to the proposal of a tripartite
discussion [regarding incorporating Nepal into potential augmentation
schemes].‖).
255 Kraska, supra note 198, at 481.
256 Id.
257 Hamner & Wolf, supra note 247, at 160.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Khalid, supra note 187, at 570.
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3.2. India’s Inter-Basin Water Transfer Project and Upstream Dams
Several planned actions261 by India—through their
manipulation of surface water flows—might be threats to
Bangladesh‘s ultimate well-being. The largest of these is the Indian
Inter-Basin Water Transfer Project.262 The Indian Government is in
the planning and design stages of a massive endeavor to rearrange
its currently uneven distribution of water in the style of the
Farakka Barrage, except on a far larger scale. The project, in
addition to smaller Indian dam projects, such as the Tipaimukh
Hydroelectric Dam on the Barak River,263 have the potential to
261 See, e.g., North Eastern Electric Power Map, N.E. ELEC. POWER CORP.,
http://www.neepco.gov.in/neepco/jsps/popupimg.html?/neepco/images/nee
pcomapNew.jpg (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (depicting the locations of India‘s
planned actions on a map); Projects to be Taken Up, N.E. ELEC. POWER CORP.,
http://www.neepco.gov.in/neepco/index.jsp (hover over ―Projects‖ hyperlink;
then follow ―Future Projects‖ hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (listing the
current status of projects planned for states in the North Eastern region); Projects
Under Execution, N.E. ELEC. POWER CORP., http://www.neepco.gov.in/neepco
/index.jsp (hover over ―Projects‖ hyperlink; then follow ―Ongoing Projects‖
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (providing information on various gas and
hydro electric based projects); see also Projects List, NAT‘L HYDROELEC. POWER
CORP., http://www.nhpcindia.com/Projects/Project_index.aspx (last visited Mar.
15, 2011) (listing National Hydroelectric Power Corporation‘s projects by type and
then by name).
262 See generally Inter Basin Water Transfer: The Need, NAT‘L WATER DEV.
AGENCY, http://nwda.gov.in/index2.asp?slid=3&sublinkid=3&langid=1 (last
visited Mar. 15, 2011) (stating the reasons the Indian Government plans to
redistribute water from excess areas to shortage areas and the most effective ways
of doing so).
263 See Welcome to Tipaimukh Project, NAT‘L HYDROELEC. POWER CORP.,
http://www.nhpcindia.com/Projects/English/Scripts/Prj_Features.aspx?Vid=16
7 (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (describing the project, as summarized by the
implementation agency). See generally Syed Zain Al-Mahmood, Muddying the
Waters, STAR WEEKEND MAG. (Bangl.), July 10, 2009, http://www.thedailystar.net
/magazine/2009/07/02/cover.htm (describing India‘s Tipaimukh dam project
and its potential dangerous effects on Bangladesh); Mohiuddin Alamgir,
Tipaimukh: Another Farakka in the Offing?, NEW AGE XTRA (June 12, 2009),
http://media.causes.com/ribbon/502745 (drawing comparisons between the
Tipaimukh Dam and the Farakka Barrage). Some have predicted that Tipaimukh
will have devastating, irreversible effects in Bangladesh. See Mustafizur Rahman
Tarafdar, Tipaimukh Dam: An Alarming Venture, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Apr. 25, 2009,
http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=85451 (predicting environmental,
economic, and agricultural havoc if the Tipaimukh dam is built); see also Syed
Zain Al-Mahmood, The Dam Documents, STAR WEEKEND MAG. (Bangl.), July 24,
2009, http://www.thedailystar.net/magazine/2009/07/04/followup.htm (noting
inadequacies and suspect items within the published portions of the feasibility
and impact studies). Note, however, that India has assured Bangladesh that
because the dam is a hydroelectric plant, it is not a danger to Bangladeshi interests
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exacerbate Bangladesh‘s arsenic crisis by placing even more
disincentives264 upon Bangladesh to rely on surface water.
Bangladesh might, as a result, need to try leveraging international
law to prevent or limit the effects of these unilateral Indian projects
destined to affect Bangladesh‘s water supply.
IBWT involves the diversion of water from the Ganges and the
Brahmaputra.265 Its construction was authorized by a decision of
the Indian Supreme Court.266 The project has two components—a
Himalayan component that will link fourteen rivers in northern
India, and a Peninsular component that will link sixteen rivers in
southern India.267
as it does not divert water away from the Barak River. Tipaimukh Dam Won’t
Harm: India, BANGL. NEWS, May 20, 2009, http://www.independentbangladesh.com/2009051910988/country/tipaimukh-dam-won-t-harmindia.html.
264 See generally Sudha Ramachandran, India, Bangladesh Fight Against the
Current, ASIA TIMES, June 8, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia
/HF08Df04.html (reporting non-arsenic related difficulties that have arisen from
India‘s use of the Farakka Barrage, including the consistent diminution of the flow
of water into Bangladesh , and resultant concerns arising from IBWT and
Tipaimukh).
265 See generally Inter Basin Water Transfer: The Need, supra note 262 (describing
potential ways to address water shortages and noting the excess of water in the
Northern reaches of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra).
266 See Keya Acharya, Scheme to Link Major Rivers Divides India, ENV‘T NEWS
SERV., July 17, 2003, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jul2003/2003-07-1701.html (―The scheme has been given added weight by the Supreme Court of
India which, on a public interest litigation filed by farmers from southern India
asking the government to provide water to all, passed an Order requiring the
project to be completed by 2016.‖); see also Ahsan, supra note 183 (relating news of
minister-level talks between India and Bangladesh and conveying fear that India‘s
river link project will harm Bangladesh‘s water supply). Manoj Mitta provides a
narrative of the series of events that led to the court pronouncement: In August
2002, the Indian President Kalam made a ―passing‖ observation in an address to
the nation, listing problems that required urgent attention, including uneven
water distribution across the nation. Manoj Mitta, The River Sutra, INDIAN EXPRESS,
Mar. 2, 2003, http://www.indianexpress.com/oldStory/19364/. In August 2002,
senior advocate Ranjit Kumar filed a copy of the speech along with other
documents to the Supreme Court on a separate matter, the clean-up of Yamuna
River. Id. Chief Justice of India Kirpal responded ―so enthusiastically‖ that the
Supreme Court converted Kumar‘s application into a writ petition and issued
notices on the need to network rivers. Id.
267 NAT‘L COUNCIL OF APPLIED ECON. RESEARCH, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
INTERLINKING OF RIVERS PROGRAMME 3 (2008) (India), available at http://www
.nwda.gov.in/writereaddata/mainlinkfile/File277.pdf; see also India’s National
River-Linking Project: India’s River Linking Map, INT‘L WATER MGMT. INST.,
http://nrlp.iwmi.org/main/maps.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (mapping
where rivers will be linked for the Peninsula and the Himalayan Components).
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The Project‘s objectives, according to the Indian National Water
Development Agency, are ―to increase the irrigation potential for
increasing the food grain production, mitigate floods and droughts
and reduce regional imbalance in the availability of water,‖ by
transferring water from areas of surplus to deficit areas.268 The
intention is to ―build storage reservoirs on these rivers and connect
them to other parts of the country,‖ so that a ―lot of benefits by
way of additional irrigation, domestic and industrial water supply,
hydropower generation, navigational facilities etc. [sic] would
accrue.‖269
Using Farakka as a guide, it seems easy to surmise the adverse
consequences that the Indian IBWT Project—a thorough, expensive
redesign of natural water movement through the entire
subcontinent—will likely have on the economy, ecology, biology,
and sustainable development of Bangladesh.270 Among other
projected ecological and economic effects (e.g. a crippling of
Bangladesh‘s fishing industry271), some contend that the intrusions
of salinity caused by the IBWT Project ―will render the ground
water [further] contaminated and undrinkable, causing further
scarcity in surface water.‖272 Citing studies on the potential
impacts of the Indian IBWT Project, Shawkat Alam warns:
The Indian River-Linking Project will irreparably alter
natural ecosystems by an unnatural modification of the
hydrological cycle through the use of canal systems, and it
will seriously affect biological diversity by upsetting the
natural equilibrium. Such extensive geomorphic changes
Inter Basin Water Transfer: The Need, supra note 262.
Id.
270 See Shawkat Alam, An Examination of the International Environmental Law
Governing the Proposed Indian River-Linking Project and an Appraisal of Its Ecological
and Socio-Economic Implications for Lower Riparian Countries, 19 GEO. INT‘L ENVTL. L.
REV. 209, 213 (2007) (discussing the impacts of the Indian River-Linking Project).
271 See Khalid, supra note 187, at 555.
268
269

According to Jayanta Bandopadhya, of the Centre of Development and
Environment Policy at the Indian Institute of Management in Kolkata,
arresting the natural flow of rivers on a gigantic scale could sound ―the
death knell‖ for mangroves in the delta region of West Bengal and
Bangladesh because mangroves require the steady rise and fall of the sea
level so that their roots can breathe. Once this process is disrupted, the
world could ―lose the richest fisheries in South Asia‖. [sic]
Id.
272

Alam, supra note 270, at 216.
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will greatly increase the probability of microbial and
infectious diseases because of the lack of water in areas
where it was once present, thereby increasing the already
inadequate levels of sanitation of the malnourished and
poverty-stricken people who will become displaced.273
These types of conclusions are, of course, speculative. Indeed,
there seems to be insufficient data regarding the project itself to
make proper conclusions; the scale of destructiveness for
Bangladesh largely depends on how much water India intends to
divert. Some observers suggest that there are ways IBWT might
actually help Bangladesh by preventing monsoon season flooding,
provided that India draws water below a certain threshold.274
Still, barring a change in course from India herself—which,
granted, is entirely possible because India is quite divided about
whether or not to proceed with the project275—Bangladesh might
find it beneficial to look to international law to stand between
Bangladesh and the dire consequences of the IBWT Project and
other Indian water manipulation projects.
273 Id.; see also ANIK BHADURI & B. K. ANAND, LINKING RIVERS IN THE GANGESBRAHMAPUTRA BASIN: EXPLORING THE TRANSBOUNDARY EFFECTS AND POSSIBILITY OF A
WIN-WIN SITUATION 2 (2008), available at http://nrlp.iwmi.org/PDocs/DReports
/Phase_02/04.%20Linking%20Rivers%20in%20the%20Ganges-Brahmaputra
%20River%20Basin-Anik%20bhaduri%20et%20al.pdf (stating that above a certain
level, diversions of large amounts of water ―could affect the ecology of the
Brahmaputra River Basin in Bangladesh‖ and that ―there is a chance of a huge
environmental catastrophe in Bangladesh because of the salinity ingress that
could arise from the depletion of water in the downstream Brahmaputra‖).
274 See generally BHADURI & ANAND, supra note 273, at 5–6 (attempting to
model a reasonable water sharing method between Bangladesh and India—
utilizing altruism and a beneficent social planner for the entire Ganges basin—
that would result in benefits for both parties, despite the reduction in water for
Bangladesh). However, note that this suggestion is predicated on the amount of
altruism India is willing to show to Bangladesh, given its own very extensive
water needs.
275 See Tushaar Shah, Upali Amrasinghe & Peter McCornick, India’s River
Linking Project: The State of the Debate, in STRATEGIC ANALYSES OF THE NATIONAL
RIVER LINKING PROJECT (NRLP) OF INDIA SERIES 2 at 1, 10–13 (Upali A. Amarasinghe
& Bharat R. Sharma eds., 2008) (summarizing various Indian reservations to
engaging in a project at the scale of the proposed IBWT, including concern over
environmental and social costs, as well as fraying political ties with India‘s
neighbors); see also Acharya, supra note 266 (describing the mixed reactions to
India‘s river-linking plan); M. S. Menon, A Case for Inter-Basin Transfer of Water,
HINDU (India), Nov. 19, 2002, http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/op
/2002/11/19/stories/2002111900130200.htm (objecting to the fears of those who
reject the IBWT and claiming that these opponents ―have conveniently forgotten
the benefits reaped from the past water transfers‖).
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SECURING MORE SURFACE WATER

Section 3 identified Bangladesh‘s disadvantages in its
negotiations with India, shortcomings inherent in the Ganges
Treaty as a result of the Farakka Barrage (and other bargaining
inequities), as well as threats to its surface water resources that are
on the horizon due to upcoming water diversion projects being
implemented by India. These issues were characterized as
obstacles to Bangladesh‘s arsenic mitigation goal of having its
population again rely on surface water as they effectively remove
the most direct manner of securing more water:
treaty
negotiations.
Section 4 will attempt to take a brighter view on Bangladesh‘s
plight by exploring other options. In general, to accomplish its
goal of reestablishing reliance on surface water, Bangladesh will
have to find a way to (1) prevent the further loss of surface water
and (2) acquire more surface water.
Regarding this first objective—while, as established in Part 3,
Bangladesh may have difficulty attempting to negotiate its way to
more water, it may find success using international law as a
defensive mechanism to prevent further surface water loss. This
section will examine ways Bangladesh may use international law
to prevent deprivation of more water from upstream due to India‘s
damming practices. It will look to relief that Bangladesh might
find under Ganges Treaty—despite its lack of an effective dispute
resolution mechanism or its inclusion of ambiguous legal
obligations upon both participating countries—and then turn to
trends in international watercourse law that may help Bangladesh
in preventing or curtailing the effects of India‘s actions, should the
government choose to turn to the international arena for help.
Regarding the second objective—taking a page from India‘s
own ambitious plans, Section 4 will also look to large-scale projects
that Bangladesh might itself pursue to attempt to leverage
currently inefficient surface water distributions. This section will
advocate the benefits of such water augmentation projects and use
India‘s example for their research and implementation, but will
caution that their ecological and economic impact be carefully
considered before implementation.276
276 Potential large-scale projects on Bangladesh‘s horizon will not have the
same international watercourse law implications as those called upon by India‘s
projects. Water diversion or storage attempts by Bangladesh will almost certainly
have impacts on Bangladesh itself, but on some level will leave its neighbors
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4.1. Stopping the IBWT Project
Bangladesh, in theory, is partially protected from unilateral
upstream water diversions under both the current treaty between
India and Bangladesh that governs transboundary rivers and
under principles derived from the evolving body of international
watercourse law. Such protections are discussed below. Note that
this section will focus on legal protections against the IBWT
project, though some of the arguments can be adapted to argue
against any unilateral upstream diversions.
4.1.1.

Securing an International Forum

First, to articulate these legal arguments and have them be
heard, Bangladesh would need to compel India to consider
whether it is violating its legal obligations to Bangladesh, listen
and find merit in Bangladesh‘s legal arguments, and alter its
actions or agree to amend water sharing treaties accordingly. As
discussed previously, this will likely not occur through political
means, given the bargaining inequities between the countries. A
third-party judicial organ is likely necessary, regardless of
Bangladesh‘s goals (whether they be the reinterpretation of the
1996 Treaty in light of emerging customary law, or the use of an
international adjudicatory body to listen and mandate an outcome
in a hypothetical water-sharing dispute between Bangladesh and
India).
This goal, unfortunately, is not easily attainable. For example,
Bangladesh might have considered attempting to voice its case
before the International Court of Justice (―ICJ‖). The ICJ serves a
dispute settlement function for those nations declaring recognition
of the ICJ‘s compulsory jurisdiction in relation to conflicts with any
other State accepting the same obligation—which India has.277
Unfortunately, Bangladesh, for any conflict with India, would not

unscathed—this is a qualified blessing as a result of Bangladesh‘s status as a lower
riparian nation.
277 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, para. 2, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993 (―The states parties to the present Statute may . . . recognize
as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other
state accepting the same obligation . . . .‖); see also Declaration letter from Swaran
Singh, Minister of External Affairs, India, to Int‘l Court of Justice (Sept. 18, 1974),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3
&code=IN&PHPSEESID=45955dcbbc3178264e1ea1a7790ba97d (declaring India‘s
recognition of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as compulsory).
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successfully gain an international venue by accepting compulsory
ICJ jurisdiction because India‘s acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction
specifically exempts itself for ―disputes with the government of
any State which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth of
Nations.‖278 This exemption might be one of many reasons
Bangladesh has not itself recognized ICJ jurisdiction (aside from
unpredictable Bangladeshi political considerations or a decision to
preserve sovereignty).
4.1.2.

Protections Under the 1996 Ganges Treaty

Section 3.1.1 discusses the limited utility of the 1996 Ganges
Treaty as a tool to compel India to enter into treaty negotiations for
the many transboundary rivers that the respective countries share.
Still—in the spirit of taking a brighter view on Bangladesh‘s
plight—it is safe to say that the Ganges Treaty does not solely
concern the Ganges River. While, as Khalid notes, the framers of
the Ganges Treaty likely did not have a project at the scale of the
Indian IBWT Project in mind,279 at minimum it is arguable that the
framers agreed to impose upon both countries some obligations
that must be adhered to when undertaking projects that affect
water-sharing, even if the precise extent of those obligations is
unclear. It seems that, by pursuing the IBWT Project without
pursuing a new treaty agreement with Bangladesh—and without,
some say, even formally notifying Bangladesh280—India is willfully

278 Declaration letter from Swaran Singh, supra note 277, para. 2; see also id.
para 5 (exempting India from ―disputes with regard to which any other party to a
dispute has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice exclusively for or in relation to the purposes of such dispute . . .‖).
279 Khalid, supra note 187, at 561.
280 Khalid provides a narrative for Indian ―double-speak‖ in 2003 on whether
it is actually proceeding with the River-Linking project.

The Indian Prime Minister announced on 15 August 2003 that the project
to link all major rivers of the country would start by the end of this year.
A Joint River Commission Meeting was due on October 2003 and the
Government of Bangladesh proposed to include the Project in the
agenda. On 30 September 2003, the Water Resources Minister of India
informed Bangladeshi officials that its proposal to link the rivers was
only at a ―conceptual stage‖. [sic] Yet, following insistence from the
Bangladeshi side, India agreed to include the issue in the agenda, though
only under the ―miscellaneous‖ head. In that meeting, India only
reiterated its position by saying that the Project is still at an amorphous
stage.
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ignoring the pro-treaty sentiments it espoused when creating
Article IX.
Note how this type of argument—that is, the argument that
India is in violation of Article IX—is not in conflict with the
preamble‘s caveat. Bangladesh would not be arguing a violation of
a ―general principle of law‖ that the Ganges Treaty established, but
rather that India is violating a specific obligation that was
bargained for and included plainly in the treaty. Similarly,
Bangladesh would not be arguing that the Treaty somehow created
some implicit legal ―precedent‖ to which India did not specifically
agree when signing the treaty; it instead would point to the clause
as an explicit present requirement that was set forth and agreed to
by both parties.
Khalid also suggests that the Treaty and the Indian IBWT
Project cannot coexist because the IBWT Project intends to divert
water from the Ganges before it reaches the point where water
allocations are measured—thus, as he puts it, ―proper
implementation of the Treaty does not allow such a [water
diversion] project[,] and the [Indian River-Linking] Project, if
implemented, would make the Treaty completely irrelevant.‖281
While Khalid does not flesh out this argument, we can perhaps try
to build one that stems from the ―lucky‖ fact that India decided to
locate the Farakka Barrage so close to the Bangladeshi border
(―below‖ much of its hydrological system) and agreed that that
point was where water allocations would be measured.282
Id. Since then, India has made rather grandiose assurances that IBWT, if
implemented, will not harm Bangladesh.
Dasmunshi reiterated New Delhi‘s assurance that India would not
implement any project that might create any problems within India or
for Bangladesh. ―Before affecting Bangladesh, this project will affect
West Bengal and Assam,‖ he said, adding, ―it would not be implemented
in 2000 years.‖
Reddy, supra note 220.
281 Khalid, supra note 187, at 561.
282 1996 Ganges Treaty, supra note 30, Annexure I. See the full ―formula‖
below:
ANNEXURE-I
Availability at Farakka
70,000 cusecs or less
70,000 – 75,000 cusecs
75,000 cusecs or more
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First, note that for the period of March 1 to May 10 every year,
the Treaty splits the Ganges flow not into percentages but respective
absolute measures of water volume owed to each country.283 While
it has already been discussed how these volumes might have been
grossly underestimated, it is worthwhile to note that India, by not
providing these volumes during these months under ―natural‖
circumstances out of its control, would be in violation of the Treaty
only because it is impossible to fulfill the conditions of the Treaty.
The story changes, however, if India cannot fulfill the Treaty by
causing the water to be unavailable to Bangladesh through
upstream diversions. In this situation, it would be directly acting
such that the terms of the Treaty—Article II(i) in conjunction with
Annexures I and II284—cannot be fulfilled. Therefore, it would be
implicitly violating the 1996 Treaty.
Further, it could also be argued that India is explicitly violating
Article II(ii) of the 1996 Treaty, which states in relevant part:
―[e]very effort would be made by the upper riparian to protect
flows of water at Farakka as in the 40-years average availability as
mentioned above.‖285 The Indian IBWT project actively shirks this
responsibility. The language is admittedly broad; however, it is
fairly clear on plain reading that the Indian IBWT project would
hardly qualify as ―every effort‖ to ―protect flows‖ on the part of
India.
Finally, Bangladesh can bolster its arguments with respect to
violations of the 1996 Treaty by pointing to the repeated inclusions
of a ―no harm‖ principle alongside an ―equitable use‖ principle,286
and using that repetition to suggest that India agreed—for, at
minimum, the Ganges—to avoid engaging in watercourse practices
harmful to its lower riparian neighbor. The benefits of equating
these principles were discussed in Section 3.1.1 and the individual

Subject to the condition that India and Bangladesh each shall receive
guaranteed 35,000 cusecs of water in alternate three 10-day periods
during the period of March 1 to May 10.
Id.
Id. art. II.
See id. Annexure-II. Annexure II is an ―indicative schedule‖ based on 40
years (1949-1988) of data of the average availability of water at Farakka for 10-day
periods.
285 Id. art. II(ii).
286 Id. arts. II, IX, X.
283
284
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principles and their legitimacy will be touched upon in Section
4.1.3.
4.1.3.

Regulation of International Rivers and Recent Trends

Principles that attempt to tackle the problems of resolving
conflicts between co-riparian water users have been developed
over the course of centuries by lawmakers and scholars. As of this
writing, no active convention or treaty applies directly to
Bangladesh‘s plight in the face of India‘s upstream IBWT project
(aside, potentially, from the 1996 Ganges Treaty itself, as discussed
in Section 4.1.2).287 Thus, it might be useful to examine water
regulation principles that have arisen over the centuries and glean
the direction in which they flow with respect to acceptance by the
international community. These principles—arising both from
multilateral agreements and soft-law instruments—pertain to
transboundary rivers and might prove useful to Bangladesh in
crafting legal arguments in an international forum.
At minimum, it is clear that the old principle of absolute
territorial sovereignty over rivers, a concept favoring upper riparian
state rights and articulated by Grotius as ―the property of the
people through whose territory it flows‖ has been largely
abandoned.288 As evidence of this, Alam points to the adoption of
a more equitable distribution of rights in treaties entered into by
various upper riparian nations such as the United States, Austria,
and India.289 The principle‘s waning acceptance is also evident in
decisions by international juridical bodies, which have rejected the
position290 as evident in the 1941 Trail Smelter Arbitration291 and the
1949 ICJ Corfu Channel case.292

287 Note, however, that Bangladesh can call upon separate obligations to
which India has agreed—by virtue of India‘s various multilateral treaty
memberships—and claim that India would violate those obligations if it proceeds
with its upstream damming projects. These include obligations under the London
Convention Related to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State,
the Rome International Plant Protection Convention, the World Heritage
Convention, and the Convention of Migratory Species. See Alam, supra note 270,
at 230 (enumerating multilateral commitments made by India that the damming
project would theoretically violate).
288 Id. at 220.
289 See Alam, supra note 270, at 220–21. (discussing changing customs and
principles in international water law as reflected by treaty).
290 See Khalid, supra note 187, at 563 (noting a shift in customs and principles
in international water law as defined by international judicial bodies).
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It is also clear that the conceptual ―opposite,‖ the principle of
absolute territorial integrity—which requires upper riparian
countries to utilize a river resource in such a manner so as not to
affect the flow of the river to lower riparian countries—is similarly
inapplicable, as it never took hold in the international realm.293
Two principles more readily embraced by modern
international law are also embraced by the Ganges Treaty itself:
the obligation not to inflict appreciable harm (or the “no harm”
principle noted in Section 3.1.1) and the equitable use principle
(noted in Section 3.1.2). The former imposes an obligation not to
use, or to allow the use of, territory for acts contrary to the rights of
other states and has appeared in various soft-law instruments.294
This doctrine is beneficial to Bangladesh as it obliges riparians to
consider the effects their actions have on co-riparians, instead of
ignoring them and pursuing projects under the theory of state
sovereignty.295
The latter—the widely-held doctrine of reasonable and
equitable use—establishes that states shall optimally, equitably,

291 Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), Decision, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (Trial
Smelter Arb. Trib 1938).
292 Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
293 See Khalid, supra note 187, at 563 (―This principle states that lower riparian
states have the right to the continuous or natural flow of a river flowing from
upper riparian states.‖).
294 See, e.g., Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, supra note 187, at 4. The Stockholm Declaration emphasized that
although states are allowed to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, they have the responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction do not cause damage to other states; this concept has
appeared in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1992
Convention on Biological Diversity, and the 2002 Johannesburg Earth Summit.
Alam, supra note 270, at 218. But see CHARLES B. BOURNE, The International Law
Commission’s Draft Articles on the Law of International Watercourses: Principles and
Planned Measures, in INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR
CHARLES B. BOURNE 83, 98–103 (Patricia Wouters ed., 1997) (describing how the
principle of no harm directly contradicts the principle of equitable utilization and
questioning the principle‘s status as customary law by criticizing the use of the
Trail Smelter, Corfu Channel, and Lac Lanoux cases as legitimate ―precedent‖ for the
no harm principle).
295 The old principle of state sovereignty has also been limited over the years.
Alam points to the implicit restraints found within UN Charter itself, which
requires participants to give due account to the well-being of its fellow nations in
social, economic, and commercial matters. Alam, supra note 270, at 218; U.N.
Charter art. 55.
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and reasonably utilize the watercourse in their respective
territories296; this principle merits some discussion.
The principle was articulated by the 1966 Helsinki Rules on the
Uses of Waters of International Rivers,297 a document that was
produced by the International Law Association and not bolstered
by the weight of any intergovernmental body; it was revised and
updated in the 2004 Berlin Rules on Water Resources.298 The
principle was also incorporated into the 1997 Watercourse
Convention.299
India, in some ways, leans on the principle of equitable use,
which allows for the use of watercourses according to a country‘s
need. This leaning is evident from India‘s negotiations during the
formation of the Mahakali and Ganges Treaties, where it often
used its need as a justification for its positions, defining ―need‖ to
296 See supra notes 206–13 and accompanying text (discussing India‘s
watercourse management in wet and dry seasons and its effect on Bangladesh, as
well as the doctrine of equitable use generally).
297 See Int‘l Law Ass‘n, Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, 52 INT‘L L.
ASS‘N REP. CONF. 447, 486 (1966) (―Each basin State is entitled, within its territory,
to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an
international drainage basin.‖).
298 See Int‘l Law Ass‘n, Berlin Conference on Water Resources Law: Fourth Report,
71 INT‘L LAW ASS‘N REP. CONF. 334, 361 (2004). Interestingly, the principle of
equitable utilization is prefaced by an articulation of the no harm principle noted
before:

1. Basin States shall in their respective territories manage the waters of an
international drainage basin in an equitable and reasonable manner
having due regard for the obligation not to cause significant harm to
other basin States.
2. In particular, basin States shall develop and use the waters of the basin
in order to attain the optimal and sustainable use thereof and benefits
therefrom, taking into account the interests of other basin States,
consistent with adequate protection of the waters.
Id.
299 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, arts. 5–7, supra note 189. The Convention requires 35 ratification
documents to come into force. Id. art. 36(1). Note that Bangladesh voted for 1997
Watercourse Convention but India abstained from voting. Khalid, supra note 187,
at 562. The convention has not yet accumulated 35 ratification documents. Id.
This obviously reduces the applicability of the 1997 Watercourse Convention,
especially given the following argument which one observer raises: because the
Convention is looked upon with particular suspicion and given particular
disregard in the South and East Asian regions, its applicable principles are
rendered suspect. Erica J. Thorson, Sharing Himalayan Glacial Meltwater: The Role of
Territorial Sovereignty, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 487, 510-11 (2009).
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include
its
population‘s
significant
―socio-economic
requirements.‖300 This utilization of the doctrine has been decried
by some observers as unreasonable and contrary to the doctrine‘s
goal of efficiency.301 As noted by Alam:
[India‘s] aggressive pursuit of economic prosperity while
maintaining . . . unsustainable consumptive patterns,
through the diversion and damming of environmental
flows . . . requires even greater diversions of water to meet
present needs. Hence, the traditional doctrine of equitable
use actually results in increased waste, as the supposedly
―optimal and reasonable use‖ for the further development
of water resources has often been based on little more than
the supply that is needed to prop up existing inefficiencies
in water transmission and usage.302
Thus, under a sophisticated interpretation of the equitable use
doctrine that takes into account the doctrine‘s goals, India‘s
attempted justifications might ring hollow.303
The 1997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros decision of the ICJ illustrates this
in a way and might be of particular interest to Bangladesh because
of its commentary relating to the equitable use of transboundary
watercourses. The dispute was regarding the use of the Danube
River.304 One of the parties in the case, Czechoslovakia, was
attempting to build a dam, which had the possibility of wreaking
environmental havoc on Hungary.305
Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 300.
Alam, supra note 270, at 223.
302 Id.
303 There is support for this contention in the soft-law instruments previously
mentioned. The 1997 Watercourse Convention—which can be characterized as an
advocate of the equitable use doctrine—takes pains to include in Article 7 the
principle of ―no significant harm.‖ Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses, supra note 189. Recall that this
was also the case in the Berlin Rules. See Int‘l Law Ass‘n, supra note 298. This
suggests that, on some level, ―no harm‖ is increasingly being folded into the
concept of ―equitable utilization.‖ Granted, as discussed in note 299, neither
Bangladesh nor India are bound by the 1997 Watercourse Convention, but this at
minimum is a persuasive indication that India‘s no-holds-barred interpretation of
the equitable use doctrine that allows unfettered unilateral rearrangements of a
complex water system is contrary to emerging international legal obligations.
304 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 16
(Sept. 25).
305 Id. para. 53.
300
301
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The ICJ affirmed that Hungary and Czechoslovakia each had
an equal right to the benefits of the Danube‘s water resources,
including the use of the water for hydropower, recreational
enjoyment, fisheries, and other benefits.306 In arriving at this
conclusion, the Court noted that both Hungary and
Czechoslovakia enjoyed a customary right ―to an equitable and
reasonable sharing of the resources of an international
watercourse.‖307
For Bangladesh‘s purposes, ICJ provided guidelines in relation
to the use and ownership of shared water resources.308 It notably
used the principle of equitable use against the violating riparian. In
deciding the effect of the construction of the GabcikovoNagymaros dam project on the Danube, it held that
Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally assuming jurisdiction over a
shared watercourse, deprived Hungary of its right to an equitable
and reasonable share of the natural resources and consequently
failed to respect established principles of international law.309
Alam views the ICJ‘s judgment in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros as
strengthening the claims of downstream states such as
Bangladesh.310 Its holding strongly suggests that India‘s proposed
solution to the issue of droughts and floods as it strives to attain
economic growth—via assertion of ownership of the waters and
reallocation of water unfettered by sufficient concern for the
ecological integrity of the environment—is disallowed under
international law,311 or at the very least, becoming less accepted
under international law.
There are other fledgling doctrines that merit mention, as they
might help Bangladesh argue regarding the emergence of trends in
customary international law that militate against the legality of the
Indian IBWT Project.
Generally speaking, there appears to be a trend in the
international sphere towards recognizing the need for a ―holistic‖
management of global environmental resources—a need which
Id. para. 85; Thorson, supra note 299, at 502.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 78
(Sept. 25).
308 See generally Alam, supra note 270, at 227.
309 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 85
(Sept. 25).
310 See generally Alam, supra note 270, at 227.
311 Id. at 229.
306
307
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was articulated in the Rio Declaration.312 The Rio Declaration
emphasizes long-term development of global freshwater resources
with an understanding of the ―interconnectedness of the elements
related to freshwater and freshwater quality.‖313 The Declaration
specifically notes that the organic unity of river systems ―demands
that freshwater management be holistic‖314—dealing with the
entire river basin and not just the portions of the river within a
country‘s borders.315 Bangladesh can leverage this type of trend to
argue that the Indian IBWT Project fails to consider the harms that
it will likely inflict on the rest of the Ganges River System.316
This is similar to the ―community of interest‖ theory, which is a
modification of the equitable use doctrine that ignores national
boundaries to treat an entire transboundary water resource as a
single economic and geographic entity, and has found some
traction in the slowly developing field of international
groundwater law.317 The ICJ, meanwhile, has articulated a vague
and broad ―precautionary principle‖ which holds states to the
general obligation of ensuring that activities within their control
respect the environments of other states.318 The International Law
Commission of the UN has drafted procedural obligations for
states engaging in activities that create a risk of causing significant
transboundary harm. This, in a sense, may be the beginning of a
trend towards recognizing a duty to cooperate with other countries
in mitigating transboundary risks.319 If they develop further, all of
these international law principles will likely aid Bangladesh in a
hypothetical dispute or in the imposition of preventative legal
obligations by the 1996 Ganges Treaty.

Id. at 219.
Id. at 219 (citing United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 13–14, 1992, Resolutions Adopted by the
Conference, 18.36, U.N. Doc A/CONF 151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1) (1993)).
314 Id.
315 Id. at 219–20.
316 Bangladesh can also leverage this type of trend to argue the need of a
multilateral treaty. See discussion supra Section 3.1.4.
317 Khalid, supra note 187, at 564.
318 Id.
319 Id.
312
313
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4.2. Independent Surface Water Augmentation Plans
The previous sections outline the obstacles Bangladesh faces in
attempting to secure more surface water from its upper riparian
neighbors.
Bilateral negotiations feature cripplingly large
bargaining inequities, which Bangladesh might minimize by
insisting upon a third-party entity to help arbitrate discussions.
There are, meanwhile, practical roadblocks to an ideal multi-lateral
treaty and centuries might transpire while waiting for such pleas to
come to fruition. If anything, Bangladesh might be able to leverage
international law to prevent further deprivations of surface water as
long as it manages to articulate its legal arguments before an
independent juridical organ, though this too leaves an awful lot to
chance and faith. Thus, in the meantime, Bangladesh might do
better to look within for solutions to its water shortages. The final
portion of this discussion will scrutinize Bangladesh‘s efforts at
pursuing internal surface water augmentation plans, and examine
why they have yet to garner any actual results.
The acquisition of more surface water requires a creative and
concerted effort that is focused inward. Bangladesh will need to
borrow ideas from its neighbors (such as India) who are facing
similar (though not identical) challenges, in providing sufficient
quantities of clean water for their populations, and adapt these
solutions for its own plight.
Bangladesh can, for example, follow India‘s lead and
incentivize installations of rainwater collectors on buildings in
urban areas. It can research and develop its own barrages to try
leveraging its monsoon season excesses for the benefit of its
drought seasons. If Bangladesh is able to ―get its act together‖ and
take significant steps towards augmenting surface water sources
on its own, it will have a considerably easier time addressing its
arsenic problems.
Indeed, it is likely that Bangladesh will have a chance for
success in addressing its arsenic mitigation woes only after it
pursues internal surface water augmentation strategies. Only then
can it design and implement purification mechanisms for surface
water and lure its population away from the poisonous
groundwater. Note that doing so would not likely violate any
international obligations (Bangladesh is the ―lowest‖ riparian in
the Ganges basin, and thus would have minimal effect on its
neighbors), and would constitute a positive trend towards selfreliance (which is necessary due to the bargaining inequities that
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Bangladesh faces). Yet, it will also require, on the part of
Bangladesh, (1) an earnest and vigorous solicitation of foreign aid
coupled with (2) a good-faith effort to cut corrupt misallocation of
funds and (3) the encouragement of long-term individual political
commitment to whatever large-scale engineering projects it
chooses. It can thereby earn foreign trust and, in turn, secure more
funding.
This has not happened yet. Some of the reasons for this were
examined in Section 2.1. The Government is not solely to blame, as
it is consistently dealt a particularly difficult hand filled with
natural disasters, continued poverty, and giant developing
neighbors.
Still, the lack of progress on large-scale efforts at surface water
augmentation is frustrating. ―Since 1963, Bangladesh (then East
Pakistan) has sought to build a barrage . . . to store the wet season
flow of the Ganges for use during the dry season.‖320 While India
initially opposed this plan—largely because of the barrage‘s
proposed location and concerns over the effects on India’s
environment—it has since come around and approved its
building.321
Land was bought and a stone foundation built for the project as
early as 1980.322 However, the various governments since then
have failed to act.323
A feasibility study was conducted in 1997, which enumerated
the plan‘s potential positive effects (increased water flow, reduced
saline intrusion, irrigation help in the southwest, and prevention of
flooding in Bangladesh).324 Experts predicted that if the barrage
were built, it would increase navigability of the rivers in the region
and ultimately save the Sundarbans.325 The plan would essentially
See generally Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 333.
See id. (discussing India‘s initial opposition to Bangladesh‘s water
preservation plans).
322 See Dhaka May Build Barrage on Ganga, TURKMENISTAN NEWS.NET, Feb. 25,
2009, http://www.turkmenistannews.net/story/470913 (discussing the need for
Bangladesh to complete the Ganga Barrage Project); Pinaki Roy, Rivers Dying as
Ganges Project Remains in Limbo, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 26, 2008,
http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=20633.
323 See Roy, supra note 322 (highlighting the failure of the Bangladeshi
Government by neither completing the Ganga Barrage Project nor making any
significant progress toward its completion).
324 See Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 334 (discussing the optimization of
water usage potentially realizable through completion of the Ganga Barrage).
325 See generally Roy, supra note 322.
320
321
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leverage the flood-excesses and attempt to redistribute the water to
the areas of Bangladesh suffering from consistent drought. In 1999,
formal funding was requested for the project from the Asia
Development Bank and other international organizations. Even
India offered to help with the technical aspects of the barrage.326
Yet, the structure remains un-built. Six years later, following
WARPO recommendations in 2005, the government took
initiatives327 to appoint consultants for a new feasibility study.328 It
is unclear whether this feasibility study took place and no action
has followed from the government.
In 2009, there was a renewed flurry of activity regarding
surface water augmentation plans. In April, the finance ministry
committee approved the selection of a consulting firm to carry out
a new “feasibility and detailed engineering model study‖ of the
barrage.329 In May, the $4 million dollar feasibility study was
approved.330 In July, Bangladesh sought ―$1.4 billion to implement
the Ganges Barrage Project, and $88.12 million for restoration of
the flow of the Buriganga River and for a project for prevention of
river pollution‖ from China.331
While these seem like steps in the direction of actual
construction, it is unclear whether the project will actually come to
fruition, or whether this is merely political posturing by the
government that is currently in power.
Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 334.
See generally MINISTRY OF WATER RES., BANGL. WATER DEV. BD., TERMS OF
REFERENCE FOR FEASIBILITY STUDY AND DETAILED ENGINEERING OF GANGES BARRAGE
PROJECT (2005).
328 See Roy, supra note 322 (noting that the Bangladeshi Government has
hired consultants for a feasibility study of the engineering planning and
environmental impacts of a Ganges Barrage, and has even opened an office to
examine the ―Feasibility of Ganges Barrage Project‖).
329 See Mirza Ahsan, Dhaka Firm Seeks 3 Nations’ Help to Design Ganga Barrage,
A PAK. NEWS, Apr. 10, 2009, http://www.apakistannews.com/dhaka-firm-seeks3-nations-help-to-design-ganga-barrage-114144 (discussing the solicitation of
design support from Australia, Pakistan, and China in completion of the Ganga
Barrage Project).
330 See Deal Signed for Feasibility Study on Ganges Barrage, DAILY STAR (Bangl.),
May 7, 2009, http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid
=87156 (discussing the finalization of a deal to conduct a feasibility study for the
Ganga Barrage Project).
331 See Bangladesh to Seek $4.68 Bn Assistance from China, LIVEMINT.COM, July
27, 2009, http://www.livemint.com/2009/07/27142527/Bangladesh-to-seek-468bn-as.html (discussing the aid package solicited by Bangladesh from China in
support of various infrastructure projects).
326
327
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It is commendable that the Bangladesh government is acting
with caution; perhaps the decades of effort—and delay—are to
ensure that any surface water augmentation plan is safe for the
environment and relatively free of long-term ecological and
economic side effects. Bangladesh‘s fragile hydrology, after all,
may not be able to survive too many more detrimental pressures.
It is, however, doubtful that the decades of delay are the result of
ecological trepidation. Publicity stunts and general political
inaction in the absence of progressive vision might be at play.
Self-sufficient projects like the Ganga Barrage are the key to
acquiring sufficient surface water and easing pressure on
Bangladesh‘s arsenic mitigation attempts. Bangladesh will not lift
itself out of its poisonous dilemma unless it takes decisive action to
study the feasibility of the barrage, determines ways to minimize
the negative effects that it might have on the country, acquires
money for its construction—solicited from entities like the World
Bank or the Asian Development Bank, both of which have shown
considerable generosity in the past—and builds a solution to its
surface water crisis.
Only then will it free itself from arsenic.
5.

CONCLUSION

A thorough examination of Bangladesh‘s arsenic crisis reveals a
multi-layered problem without an easy solution. Significant
challenges arise from attempts to leverage theoretically ample
groundwater and surface water resources.
Groundwater is easily available, but poisonous and difficult to
purify for consumption. It is tempting for agricultural use, but the
negative impact that this use has on the soil is a devastating and
distant-seeming to unaware users. Surface water, meanwhile, is
polluted and—due in part to upper riparian practices—inconstant;
surface water drowns Bangladesh during monsoons and leaves
Bangladesh parched during dry seasons.
Addressing these
challenges requires both reform of internal government policies
and leveraging international law.
The Bangladeshi Government needs to address the stagnation
of large-scale water management projects that fail to succeed
despite significant investment from outside entities. It needs to
enact policies that preserve project-related job security despite
political turmoil; this type of action may also discourage funding

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

SARWAR.DOC

908

3/18/2011 9:26 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 32:3

misallocations, corruption, and ineffectiveness, as it could force
individual interests to coincide with the project‘s interests.
Part of this high-level stagnation can also be addressed by
fixing the systemic misdirection that has plagued mitigation
attempts. To refocus the mitigation process, the government
should update its national standard for acceptable arsenic
consumption; this will help reveal the scope of the country‘s true
need for non-groundwater solutions. The Government should also
update its Implementation Plan for Arsenic Mitigation with costsharing provisions for installations and payment for caretakers. It
should include in this plan a more realistic estimate of the number
of families that should be served by individual technology
implementations, and update its recommendations on technology
that should be used based on data that have been gathered
regarding their efficacy.
Bangladesh should consolidate and codify its water
management policies into a binding, enforceable water act that
imposes negative consequences upon local governments, as well as
implementing agencies, for failure to adhere to water laws.
Bangladesh should also pass a groundwater act that limits tubewell drilling, ensures adequate replenishment of aquifers through
the protection of wetlands, and encourages studies to determine
the geologic feasibility of deep tube-well installations. The
government needs to find ways to enforce its water laws by
granting rewards for adherence and imposing penalties for
derogations. To do so, it should borrow strategies applied by its
neighbors, like India.
To improve its current arsenic mitigation efforts, the
government should set up—or revamp—a centralized monitoring
system that keeps track of technology implementations and their
functional status. It should take stronger measures encouraging
rainwater as a solution—and overcoming the cultural resistance to
rainwater—by amending national building laws and zoning codes
to require its use. It should also, on a national level, require
incentives and job security for the caretakers of water installations.
Without mandates on a national level, it is unlikely that state
governments or local governments will spontaneously enact such
measures.
In short, Bangladesh, from the perspective of policy reform and
the correction of the current systemic misdirection, needs to, on a
national level, discourage short-term alternative safe water sources
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and encourage the development of long-term solutions that
consider the total water resources of the country.
This is especially true due to the fact that the country‘s soil—
and thus its agriculture—is being poisoned. Getting people to stop
drinking tube-well water is necessary but insufficient; the
government needs to find a way to stop them from using it to
irrigate crops.
To do so, it will need to secure a more constant source of
surface water so that entities can rely upon sufficient quantity to
improve quality. Surface water is needed. If Bangladesh is to rely
more on surface water, it needs to turn to international law. This is
especially necessary given India‘s looming Indian Inter-Basin
Water Transfer Project, which threatens to further deplete
Bangladesh surface water resources.
Any goal to obtain water from transboundary rivers via
political negotiations is unfortunately complicated. The Ganges
Treaty‘s formation—as well as the impotence of its dispute
resolution
mechanisms—indicates
that
pure
one-on-one
negotiations are insufficient to protect Bangladesh‘s interests. The
uneven bargaining positions of India and Bangladesh necessitate
securing an unbiased, independent body to serve as mediator in
any disputes that may arise. This type of body is likely necessary,
not only for new treaty negotiations and resolving disputes arising
from existent treaties, but also for situations in which Bangladesh
actively seeks to prevent the further loss of water.
For
non-treaty-negotiation
and
non-dispute-resolution
purposes, Bangladesh would need to gain an independent venue
for articulating its legal arguments; in such a venue, it can wield
international law.
And in such a venue, it can find support to stop the Indian
IBWT Project by using the Ganges Treaty. It can point to Indian
obligations in the Ganges Treaty related to the preservation of the
river flows. It can insist that the Ganges Treaty requires India and
Bangladesh to treat the customary international ―no harm rule‖ as
importantly as the ―reasonable and equitable use rule,‖ and thus
argue against future unilateral water diversion practices that harm
Bangladesh. Bangladesh can also contend that projects like the
Indian IBWT Project would illegally render the Ganges Treaty
irrelevant by reducing the overall quantity of water bound for
Bangladesh at a point above the Farakka Barrage.
Bangladesh can also argue that there are trends in international
watercourse law that indicate that the principle of absolute state
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sovereignty is subject to legal restraints and emerging legal
principles, such as the need to manage and alter water resources
through a consideration of hydrological systems as a whole. These
trends in customary international law have been demonstrated by
United Nations soft-law declarations and have cropped up—in
limited magnitude—in international court decisions, like
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros. These arguments can be leveraged against
the many Indian upstream damming projects that are planned and
currently underway.
In conjunction with these defensive measures to prevent
projects like the Indian IBWT Project, Bangladesh should look to
large-scale projects that attempt to leverage currently inefficient
surface water distributions across the nation. Surface water
augmentation projects like the Ganga Barrage should be pursued,
with appropriate and careful consideration of their potential
ecological and economic impacts. Bangladesh will need to study
the feasibility of such barrages, determine ways to minimize the
negative effects that they might have on the country, and acquire
money for their construction by soliciting funding from the World
Bank or the Asian Development Bank.
Once it manages that, it should go beyond merely painting the
poisonous wells installed by UNICEF and other well-meaning
entities—it should destroy them.
These steps and recommendations will not solve Bangladesh‘s
arsenic problem. However, they may help.
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